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It is rare for developing  countries  to be strongly  integrated  with
world  financial  markets,  but most  developing  countries  must be
regarded  as financially  open,  according  to new estimates.
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An economy's financial  integration  with the  integration  with world  financial  markets.
outside  world  (ttie extent  of capital  mobility
across  its borders)  is a key determinant  of some  The four tests are the: (1) magnitude  of
of its most important  macroeconomic  properties.  gross  capital flows;  (2) uncovered  interest rate
parity; (3) strength  of saving-investment  correla-
Yet little is known  about  this characteristic  tions;  and (4) behavior  of domestic  consumption
of many developing  economies.  An important  over time.
stwunbling  block  in the empirical  assessment  of
financial  integration  (openness)  is the many  The evidence  suggests  that most developing
approaches  to measuring  it.  countries  can be considered  to be financially
open  - in only 18 of the 57 developing  coun-
Montiel  describes  and evaluates  different  tries  classified  did the data fail to show financial
tests of capital mobility,  surveys  existing  evi-  openess  - and that many countries  may be
dence,  and applies  four tesis of capital  mobility  experiencing  an increased  degree  of integration
- to assess the degree to vwhich  the many  with world  finan_Aal  mairets.
developing  countries  test 4  have achieved
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Refergnceg  53I. Introduction
Financial openness exists when residents of one country are
able to trade financial assets with residents of another country,
i.e., when  financial assets  are traded  goods.  The  degree  of
financial openness, however, is a  somewhat amorphous concept, not
always  clearly  defined  in  many  applications  and  difficult  to
measure.  This is unfortunate, because analytical models suggest
that the  nature of the relationship between domestic and world
financial  markets  (also  referred to  as  the  degree  of  capital
mobility) is  one of the key characteristics of any economy, serving
as  a  fundamental  determinant  of  many  of  its  most  Dasic
macroeconomic properties.  These include the scope for promoting
investment by stimulating domestic saving, the effectiveness of
fiscal and monetary policies in influencing aggregate demand, the
implication of a sustained fiscal deficit for the domestic rate of
inflation,  the  incidence of  taxes  on  capital,  and  the  proper
setting of controlled interest rates under financial repression,
among others.
A  weak definition of complete financial openness, which one
might  refer  to  as  financial  integration,  can  be  given  as  a
situation in  which the law of one price holds for financial assets
--  i.e., domestic and foreign residents trade identical assets at
the same price.  This definition relies on the absence of barriers
to capital movements.  However, it permits assets issued in one
political jurisdiction  to be imperfect substitutes in all private
portfolios with otherwise identical assets issued in a differealt
one, as well as differences in preferences between domestic and
foreign agents as to the composition  of their portfolios.  A strong
definition  would  add to this the restriction  that  identically-
defined  assets  (e.g.,  a  six-month  Treasury  bill)  issued  in
different  political  jurisdictions and  denominated  in different
currencies are perfect  substitutes  in  all private portfolios.  This
would imply that the relative rates of return on such assets would
be unaffected by their relative supplies.  This assumption would,
of course, also eliminate any scope for differences in preferences
between domestic and foreign portfolio managers.
Important macroeconomic implications follow  from  financial
integration in the strong sense.  Even under the weak definition,
however, these implications become increasingly relevant as the
degree  of  substitutability between domestic  and  foreign assets
increases in the portfolios of domestic and foreign agents.  This
could be termed  an increase  in  the degree of financial integration.A partial list of the implications of financial integration in the
strong sense would include the following:
First,  because changes in  asset excess supplies and  demands in
a small economy leave  world stocks  of particular assets  unaffected,
such  changes  would  have  essentially  no  influence  on the  world
prices  of  such  assets.  Thus,  shocks  to  domestic  saving  and
investment schedules, which affect the domestic flow excess supply
and demand for financial assets,  would leave the rates of return on
such assets confronting domestic agents unchanged 2. This means in
particular that changes in  domestic investment would not affect the
rates of return on assets available to domestic savers, and that
changes in domestic saving  would not affect the cost of capital for
domestic firms 3. Thus, increases in domestic investment would not
require increases in domestic interest  rates in order to elicit the
requisite financing.  Instead, they would be financed voluntarily
by  foreign  private  agents.  Similarly,  reductions  in domestic
saving would not discourage capital accumulation in the domestic
economy,  but  would  simply  decrease  the  country's  rate  of
accumulation of foreign assets.  The implication is that economic
growth is not limited by a scarcity of domestic saving.  It follows
that  lending  to a  developing  economy  in such  circumstances  by
external  public  agencies  would  not  add  to  the  total  pool  of
resources  available to  finance domestic  investment,  and  policy
measures to promote saving  would not increJase  domestic investment,
but would merely reduce the current account deficit.
Second, the effects of domestic fiscal and monetary policies
on aggregate demand also depend on the extent to which the economy
is financially integrated with the rest of the world.  Under the
fixed  (or predetermined) exchange rate regime that characterizes
most developing  countries, perfect financial integration in the
strong sense would imply that in  a small economy neither fiscal nor
monetary policy can influence the terms for domestic borrowing and
lending.  This means that  fiscal policy would  fail to generate
"financial crowding out", and that the effects of monetary policy
would be limited to affecting the composition of private financial
portfolios  (through capital  flows), not the  prices  of domestic
financial assets.  From the standpoint of short-run macroeconomic
stabilization in  developing countries, for example, credit  ceilings
would be very effe  eive  in improving the balance of payments in the
short run, but would do so without affecting the level of aggregate
I  Notice that, if clams on residents of this country possess
different characteristics from  claims on foreigners,  the economy is
no longer "small" in the market for such assets.
I  This statement needs to be interpreted  with care.  I mean it
to imply only that domestic nominal interest rates are unaffected
by such changes.  As further discussion will show, real rates may
well be affected.
2demand and through it the current  account balance,  the rate of
inflation,  or the level  of real  output.
Third, validity  of the strong definition  would affect an
economy's steady-state inflation rate.  The  revenue that  a
government  can  collect  from  the  inflation  tax depends  on the stock
of base money.  and on the elasticity  of bace money demand with
respect  to the rate  of inflation. Given  the  revenue  to ba raised
through  the inflation  tax,  the  smaller  the  stock  of  base  money  and
the higher  its elasticity  with  respect  to the rate  of inflation,
the higher  the steady-state  inflation  rate.  Even  under  the weak
definition  of financial  integration,  domestic agents have more
means  at  their  disposal  to  escape  an  inflation  tax (i.e.,  by  taking
capital  abroad)  than  when  the  economy  is  financially  closed. This
is  likely  to increase  the  elasticity  of  base  money  demand,  and  thus
means  that  the inflationary  consequences  of a  given  fiscal  deficit
are magnified.
Fourth, the  taxation of  capital more  generally becomes
problematic  under  a situation  of  high  capital  mobility,  since  such
taxes  can be evaded  by taking  funds  out  of the country. With high
capital  mobility  the taxation  o' capital  would  leave  the domestic
economy  with a suboptimal  capital  stock,  since  owners  of capital
would  require  an after-tax  rate  of return  in the  domestic  economy
equal  to the  pre-tax  return  available  externally.
Finally,  the design of interest  rate policy in "repressed"
economies,  in  which  domestic  interest  rates  are  subject  to  binding
legal  restrictions,  cannot  afford  to ignore  the implications  of
financial openness.  Pending  interest rate  liberalization,
administered  interest  rates  have  to be set in some fashion.  The
pursuit  of  positive  real  interest  rates  in  such  a  setting,  based  on
a  closed-economy  view  which  takes  the  domestic  marginal  product  of
capital  as the  relevant  opportunity cost  of funds,  may easily  be
frustrated  by  capital  inflows  if  the  economy  is  sufficiently  open.
It  is remarkable  that,  despite  these  well-known  macroeconomic
implications,  little  is  actually  known  about  where  many  developing
countries  may  lie  along  a  spectrum  from  effective  financial  autarky
to complete  financial  integration  (i.e.,  financial  integration  in
the strong  sense  defined  above).  Although  the vast majority  of
these countries  maintain  controls  on capital  movements (see IMF
(1990)),  their  effectiveness  is often  questioned,  and  the view is
widespread  that the mere existence  of these controls does not
justify treating these economies as financially  closed.  Yet
empirical studies assessing the  effective degree of  capital
mobility  in  developing countries have  not  been  plentiful.
Consequently policy and  analytical  work on  developing-country
macroeconomic  problems  tends  to be schizophrenic  on this issue,
treating  these  economies  sometimes  as  integrated  with  world  capital
markets in the strong sense and at other times as financially
autarkic.
3This paper will attempt to shed some light on this issue both
by examining what is currently known about the degree of financial
integration that characterizes several developing countries and by
applying the existing empirical techniques suitable to the purpose
to attempt to measure this phenomenon in several large samples of
such ccountries.  I  begin by briefly discussing  some conceptual
issues  associated with the measurement of financial integration in
the neXt section.  This  is followed by a  survey of measurement
techniques  ---  primarily developed for and applied to industrial
countries  --  in Section III.  Because industrial countries  are
typically  considered  to  be more  closely  integrated  with  world
capital markets than are most developing countries, Section  III
will  also  present  an  overview  of  the  evidence  on  financial
integration  among industrial  countries, to serve as a benchmark for
the  developing-country  discussion.  Section  IV  summarizes  the
results of existing empirical studies of financial integration in
developing countries.  The paper's empirical work is presented in
Section  V, where several  of the techniques described previously are
modified and applied to a large developing-country data set.  The
findings of this exercise are summarized in a concluding section,
which also suggests some directions for further research.
II. Some Conceptual Measurement Issues
Perhaps  one  reason  for  the  ambiguity  that  surrounds  the
empirical  degree  of  financial  integration  that  characterizes
developing (and, for that matter, industrial) economies is that no
single  approach to  its measurement  has become  widely  accepted.
Among  the  empirical  methods  that  have  been  applied,  either
informally  or  formally,  to  measure  capital  mobility  are  the
magnitude of gross capital flows, the degree to which a variety of
arbitrage conditions are satisfied, the scope for sterilization of
the effects of reserve movements on the domestic money  supply,
saving-investment correlations, and, more recently, tests based on
the Euler  equation for the path  of optimal  consumption.  This
section treats some conceptual issues  that arise in the application
of the first three of these.  Because  the use of saving-investment
correlations as indicators of the degree of capital mobility has
aroused  d  substantial controversy, conceptual  issues  associated
with this measure are best discussed in the context of specific
papers, and are thus deferred to Section III.  Similarly, since the
use  of Euler equation restrictions  to  measure financial integration
is rather novel, further discussion of issues associated with this
approach is deferred until the approach  itself  is presented  in
Section III.
1. The magnitude of capital flows
Many economists have a strongly held belief that industrial
countries are, or at least have recently become, highly integrated
financially.  This  belief  is  at  least  partly  based  on  the
observation that gross  financial flows among  such countries  are
4very substantial'. The magnitude of gross capital flows in and out
of  a  country  indeed  indicates  the  extent  to  which  financial
transactions between residents of the country and the rest of the
world actually occ---,  but the size of gross flows is  often taken to
be an imperfect indicator of the degree of financial integration.
The reason is that, while capital flows would indeed  be zero under
financial  autarky, capital  flows need not necessarily  occur between
strongly  integrated  financial  markets,  because  continuous
equalization of the prices of financial assets would remove  the
incentives for such flows.
Nevertheless, there are at least two reasons to expect that a
country enjoying  high degree  of financial integration  with the rest
of the world  should, on average, experience  large gross capital
flows.  First,  in  markets  that  are  strongly  integrated,  the
geographic locations  of the parties on the two sides of a financial
transaction  are  indeterminate.  Thus,  borrowing  and  lending by
domestic  residents  should  frequently  cross  international
boundaries.'  Second,  while  changes  in  international  rates  of
return should quickly be reflected in domestic rates under such
conditions,  preservation of  portfolio  equilibrium  for domestic
residents in response to such changes will typically require net
capital  flows.  In  the  same  vein,  if  the  prices  of  domestic
financial assets are determined in  world capital markets, domestic
financial disturbances will give rise to quantity adjustments in
domestic portfolios, and thus to net capital flows.
2. The existence of arbitrage opportunities
The  degree  of  financial  integration  has  typically  been
assessed not in terms of the size of either gross or net capital
flows  between jurisdictions,  but by the extent to which unexploited
arbitrage opportunities exist in domestic capital markets.  As
indicated  previously, weak financial integration between countries
A and B means that a given financial asset is traded at the same
price by residents of A and B, so that no profitable arbitrage
opportunities remain.  Thus, the degree of financial integration
can in principle be measured as the difference between the prices
of identical assets in  A and B.  Several  conceptual problems arise,
however, in applying this definition:
a. First, the identification of assets that  can be taken to be
"identical" in different political jurisdictions is not a trivial
*  Golub (1990)  cites the examples of Feldstein (1983), p.150,
Caprio and Howard (1984), p.4, Obstfeld (1986), p.70, and Penati
and Dooley (1984), p.7.
'  This basic insight formed the basis  for an empirical test
for capital mobility among industrial countries  by Golub  (1990)
(see Section III).
5matter.  If an asset  can be taken  to be defined  by the probability
distribution  of its  prospective  returns,  then  the  requirement  that
two assets,  to be taken  as "identical",  offer  the same  payoff  in
all states of the world, is a  very stringent one.  Lf  the
dis4.ributions  of prospective  payoffs differ between two assets
under  consideration,  then  we would  not  expect  them  to be priced  so
as to yield  the same expected  rate of return,  even in perfectly
integrated  financial  markets, unless agents were risk-neutral.
Thus,  differences  in rates  of return  between  otherwise  identical
assets  issues  in  different  political  jurisdictions  are  consistent
with  weak  financial  integration. They  may even  be  consistent  with
strong  financial  integration  if  such  assets  are  perfect  subsitutes
up to a risk factor  --  that is, if return  d4fferentials  do not
depend  on relative  asset  supplies.
b. A wide range of assets  will exist in each jurisdiction. If
transaction  costs differ across assets, then those assets with
largest  transaction  costs  may effectively  be "nontraded"  --  i.e,
their domestic  prices  may be free to vary within a broad band
before  arbitrage  with  the  rest  of  the  world  becomes  effective. For
such assets, weak financial  integration  fails.  Alternatively,
members  of a broad class of assets (say,  equities)  may be more
idiosyncratic  than assets  in arother  class and thus may be less
"identical"  to their  foreign  counterparts.  Parity  tests  involving
assets  in this  class  are simply  uninformative  about  the  degree  of
financial  integration.  Under  either  of  these  conditions,  arbitrage
tests  may hold  for some  assets  but not for  others.
c. More fundamentally,  an operationally  meaningful  measure of
financial  integration  must be one that focuses  on the scope for
domestic variables  to affect the prices of domestic financial
assets, rather than on the  existence of profitable  arbitrage
opportunities  per  so. These  notions  are  conceptually  distinct. To
see  this,  suppose  that  asset  X is  traded  in jurisdictions  A and  B,
at  prices  PI  and  PA,  and  suppose  that  pA  >  PA. If,  however,  the  sale
of X in B involves  incurring  a transaction  cost amounting  to a
fraction t of the value of the asset, then arbitrage  will be
profitable  only if  PO  >  PA(l+t). As long  as this  condition  is not
met,  profitable  arbitrage  opportunities  are absent. Yet, if t is
sufficiently  large,  the range  of variation  of PO  may never  reach
this  upper  bound,  implying  that  the price  of X in  B is effectively
determined by  domestic phenomena, even  though there  are  no
profitable  arbitrage  opportunities. In this case, the relevant
operational  description  is that  the markets for X in A and B are
n=  integrated,  in spite  of the absence  of unexploited  arbitrage
profits.
d. A  fourth difficulty  with parity conditions  as estimates  of
capital  mobility  can  be  described  by analogy  with  the  implications
of tariffs and quotas  for goods.  Both tariffs  and quotas will
cause  the  domestic  price  of an importable  good  to exceed  its  world
price,  but in the  case  of the  former  the  domestic  price  is tied  to
6the  world  price  by  an infinitely  elastic  supply,  whereas  in that  of
the  latter the domestic price responds to supply and demand
conditions in the  home  country.  Similarly, the  failure of
arbitrage conditions need  not  have  the  policy implications
associated  with imperfect  capital  mobility  if there  is a constant.
differential  between  domestic  and  external  intarest  rates  arising,
for  example,  from  taxation. In  general,  the  policy  implications  to
be  drawn  from  the  failure  of  parity  corditions  depend  on  the  source
of the failure.$
Why  mighi.  arbitrage fail between "identical"  assets in
different  political  jurisdictions? Among the reasons  that have
been  cited  are the following:
A.  Transactions  costs  in asset  trading  that  inhibit  arbitrage.
ii.  Information  costs,  coupled  with  asymmetric  information  between
domestic  and foreign  agents.
iii.  Legal  barriers  to  asset  trading  (capital  controls),  both  those
already  in  place and  (separately)  prospective  future  barriers.
iv.  Asymmetric  risks  or taxes  borne  by domestic  and foreign
investors.
All of these  represent  obstacles  to financial  integration  in the
weak sense.
III.  Empirical  Approaches  to the  Measurement  of Financial
Integration
1. The  magnitude  of gross  flows
As already  mentioned,  many  economists'  intuition  that  capital
has  become  highly  mobile  among  industrial  countries  in  recent  years
is  partly  based  on the observation  that  gross  capital  flows  among
countries have becomn very large.  Golub (1990)  attempted to
formalize  this intuition  into  an explicit  test  for the degree  of
capital mobility.  He reasoned  that, if capital  were perfectly
mobile, the country origin of borrowers  and lenders  should not
matter. This  means  that  the  share  of  total  asset  issues  in  country
A  purchased  by  residents  of  that  country  should  equal  the  country's
share  in  world  lending. Golub  tested  this  proposition  for 12  OECD
countries  during  the  70s  and  80s,  and  found  that  domestic  creditors
took  up a much  larger  fraction  of each  country's  asset  issues  than
would be predicted  based on that country's  share in total OECD
lending.  He  +..Aerpreted  this finding  of a substantial  "domestic
asset  preferen..e"  as  contradicting  the  view  that  capital  is  highly
mobile  among  OECD  countries,  though  he did find  that  even  by this
me"sure  capital  mobility  has  been increasing  among  OECD  countries
in recent  years.  In the terminology  used here,  Golub's  findings
This  point  is due  to Obstfeld  (1990).
7constitute evidence against strong financial integration, but are
consistent with the weaker version.
2. Parity conditions
a. Simple interest parity
This  condition  states  that,  under  perfect  financial
integration, the nominal return on an  asset denominated  in the
domestic currency should be equal to the return on an otherwise
identical asset denominated in foreign  currency when exchange risk
is eliminated through forward cover:
(1+i)  = (1+i  ) f/s  (1)
where i is the interest rate on the asset denominated in domestic
currency,  iv is the  interest rate  on  the  asset denominated  in
foreign currency, s  is the spot exchange rate (price of foreign
currency in terms of domestic currency), and f is the forward rate
that applies  to the same maturity as i and i^.  Operationally,
assets  are identified  as identical  by choosing assets  with the same
legal  definition  in  the  same  political  jurisdiction.  This
condition seems to hold quite closely among industrial countries.
It has been tested by comparing rates of return on Eurocurrency
deposits,  with  the  classic  reference  being  Frenkel  and  Levich
(1975).  As several authors have noted, however (see, for example,
Frankel (1986)),  because the assets being compared must be within
the same jurisdiction,  this condition is not particularly  useful in
assessing  the  degree  of  financial  integration  among  different
countries.
b. Covered interest parity
The difference between the interest rate paid by a domestic
asset and the "covered"  rate paid by an asset which is identical to
it  except  for  the  currency  of  denomination  ad  the  political
jurisdiction where the debtor is located is referred to as the
"country,"  or  "political" premium.  Tests  of  covered  interest
parity  (CIP) are  in  effect tests  for the  existence of  such  a
premium.  Until recently, the evidence (see, for example, Dooley
and  Isard  (1980)) was  consistent with  a  nonnegligible  country
premium among industrial countries.  Data for the decade of the
eighties,  however, seems to suggest that this premium may  have
disappeared, at least for a large number of industrial countries
(see  Obstfeld 1986), and Frankel (1991)).
8c. Uncovered interest parity
In the absence of forward  cover, the domestic-currency return
on an asset denominated in foreign currency becomes random, even
abstracting away from other sources of uncertainty, because of the
possibility of an exchange-rate  change.  Uncovered interest parity
(UIP) is the assertion that investors care only about the first
moment of their subjective distributions of future returns on the
risky (foreign)  asset.  If  they do, then in the absence of barriers
to  capital  movements  such as  those  listed  in  Section  II,  the
expected  returns on the domestic  and  foreign assets  should  be
equalized:
(l+i)=  (1+i')  E(s.1)  /s(2
where  E  is  the  expectations  operator.  Sufficient  (but  not
necessary) conditions for UIP are the validity of CIP and f=E(s. 1)
(the forward rate  is an unbiased  predictor  of the  future  spot
rate).  This can be shown by writing (2) as:
(l+i)=(l+i  *)(fs) (E(s, 1)/f)  (3)
Equation  (1) and  f=E(s,,)  imply  (3), yet  (3) can  hold  without
implying either  (1) or  f=E(s,,).  If CIP  holds,  the  condition
f=E(s, 1) becomes necessary and sufficient for UIP.
Testing UIP requires making an ancillary assumption about how
the unobservable subjective expectations of future exchange rate
movements are formed.  With rational expectations, E(s. 1) becomes
the expectation of the true distribution of s.,,  conditioned on the
available information.  Under these circumstances, s=E(s)+e, where
the predictioan  error e must be a mean-zero random variable.  The
contents of the information  set used to form the expectation E(s)
depend on the efficiency of the foreign exchange market.  If the
market is "weakly" efficient, the information set must contain at
least the past prediction  errors (i.e.,  lagged values of e).  Under
these circumstances, e  must be  serially uncorrelated.  UIP can thus
be tested  by running the regression:
s  = a  +bf-l  +  e  (4)
and testing the  joint hypothesis that  a=O, b=l, and e  is white
noise.  Alternatively, without postulating CIP (or in the absence
9of data on f), UIP can be tested directly by taking logs of the
lagged version of (2) and estimating:
ln(s1s 1 )  = a  + b(i 1 -il)  +  e  (5)
and again testing  whether a=O, b=l, and e is  serially uncorrelated.
That  is,  under  UIP,  rational  expectations,  and  "weak"  market
efficiency,  the  interest  differential  should  be  an  unbiased,
efficient predictor of future exchange rate depreciation.
An important pitfall in conducting either of these tests is
the "peso problem" (Krasker (1980)).  When the exchange rate is
fixed, but market participants perceive a finite probability of a
discrete devaluation which does not in fact take place during the
sample period,  the  observed forward  rate will systematically exceed
the future spot rate even if it truly reflects the expected future
spot rate.  In this case, the null hypothesis  (of unbiasedness)
will  tend  to be rejected, even when  true,  more  often  than  the
investigator intends.'
The evidence for industrial countries is that UIP does no
hold.  Many  researchers  (see, for  example, Cumby  and  Obstfeld
(1984)) have verified this finding.  One  interpretation is that
there is a non-constant (i.e.,  time-varying) risk premium.  Such a
premium could be consistent with strong financial integration, as
long as the assets are perfect substitutes  after the premium is
taken into account. Alternatively, systematic differences in rates
of return  on otherwise similar assets  denominated  in different
currencies and issued in different political  jurisdictions could
respond to changes in the relative supplies of such assets.  This
"imperfect substitutes"  case is inconsistent with strong financial
integration, and is discussed further in subsection 3 below.
d. Real interest parity
This condition requires that the expected domestic real rate
of return (measured  in terms of domestic goods) equal the expected
foreign rate of return (measured in terms of foreign goods):
7  Strictly speaking, the difficulty here is not bias, but a
small  sample  problem.  The  problem  is  that  the  sampling
distribution for the hypothesis a=O, b=l converges very slowly to
its  limiting  distribution under  the  conditions  postulated,  so
statistical tests based on the asymptotic distribution result  in
Type I error.
10r=(+i)  P/E(P, 1)  =r=(l+i  )P/E(POI)  (6)
which can be rewritten as:
(1+i)=[(1+Pi)  E(S, 1 ) /S]  [ (sP/P)  /  (E(s, 1 ) E(P.'1 ) /E(p 1))]  (7)
Thus,  sufficient conditions for RIP  are UIP and ex ante relative
PPP.  Both of these fail tend to fail among industrial countries
(see  Mishkin (1984),  and Frankel (1991))  so, not surprisingly, RIP
has been widely rejected among these countries as  well.  Failure of
ex ante RIP  among seven OECD countries is found by Mishkin (1984),
using quarterly data for the period 1967-1979.  Similarly, Cumby
and  Obstfeld  (1984)  use,  both  monthly  and  quarterly  data  from
January 1976 to September 1981 to reject ex ante  RIP among six OECD
countries  (except between the US and UK).  The same result  was
found by Mark (1985) for bilateral tests between the Us and five
OECD countries from 1973:5  to 1982:2.  More recently, Caramazza et.
al.  (1986),  using monthly data over the period 1973-85, reject the
equality  of ex ante RIP  for all pairs  tested  among  seven OECD
countries except Canada and the United States.
3. Tests of the effectiveness of sterilization
As  suggested  previously,  one  of  the  important  policy
implications of strong financial integration under fixed exchange
rates is  that monetary policy  becomes powerless to  affect aggregate
demand.  Essentially  this  is  because  the  domestic  monetary
authorities  lose control over the money supply.  Changes in the
domestic  assets of the central bank  (e.g., through open market
operations)  intended to  influence the money  stock would  create
incipient changes in the rates of return on domestic assets which
could  not  in  fact  materialize,  since  they  would  quickly  be
arbitraged  away through foreign borrowing  and lending.  In the
process, the central bank's net foreign assets would change by an
amount equal in magnitude but opposite in sign to the triggering
change in its domestic assets, leaving the stock of high-powered
money, and the total money supply, unchanged.  This result would
not  hold  if domestic  and  foreign  interest-bearing  assets  were
imperfect  substitutes,  because  then  changes  in  the  relative
supplies of such assets in private portfolios would affect their
relative rates of return.  In this case, changes in the domestic
assets  of  central banks  could,  by  changing  the  composition  of
outside assets in  private  portfolios, alter domestic interest rates
and achieve changes in the domestic money stock.
For industrial countries operating flexible exchange rates,
this issue arises in the context  of the effectiveness of sterilized
11intervention.  Given that UIP fails to hold, the issue is whether
this constitutes a rejection of strong financial integration  --
i.e. whether deviations from UIP car,  be  affected by changes  in
relative stocks of outside interest-bearing assets denominated in
different currencies, such as would be achieved through sterilized
intervention.  If so, this would support a portfolio-balance model
in which assets denominated in different currencies and issued in
different  jurisdictions are  imperfect  substitutes, rather  than
close substitutes with time-varying risk premia.
Explaining this premium remains an unresolved issue, but the
weight of the evidence suggests that it cannot easily be accounted
for by relative stocks of outside assets denominated in different
currencies.  Thus strong financial integration cannot easily be
rejected by the data (see, for eiample, Rogoff (1984)).
4. Saving-investment correlations (Feldstein-Horioka)
For a small country producing a single good that is perfectly
integrated with world goods markets as well as integrated in the
strong sense with world  financial markets, a change in domestic
saving  should  have  no  effect  on  the  rates  of  return  faced  by
domestic agents, since these are determined in the world capital
market, and accordingly should not affect domestic investment via
this route.  Based on this insight, Feldstein and Horioka (1980)
(hereafter  FH)  proposed  assessing  the  degree  of  financial
integration in the world economy by measuring the extent to which
national saving and investment rates are correlated.  Using annual
data for 21 OECD countries over the period 1960-74,  they estimated
several cross-section OLS regressions of the form:
(IIY)  1=a+b(SIY)  1+e  (8)
where (I/Y) is the ratio of gross domestic investment to GNP, and
(S/Y) is the ratio of national saving to GNP, taken as the mean of
5-year periods as  well as the full 15-year period.  FH argued that,
under  the  null  hypothesis  of  perfect  financial  integration, b
should be zero for small countries, whereas for large countries b
should approximate the country's share of the world capital stock,
since any increment in domestic saving should be invested without
regard  to national boundaries.  Their estimates of b, however, were
closely  centered  around  0.9.  This  finding was  robust  to  the
inclusion of a quadratic term for (S/Y), to the inclusion of the
population growth rate as an additional explanatory variable, to a
linear specification for b that permitted it to be a function of
"openness" variables such as the share of trade in  GDP or the size
of the economy, as well as to the use of  instrumental variables
(taking  the benefits/earnings replacement ratio of social security
programs, the proportion of retirees to the population 20-65 years
of age,  and the ratio of younger dependents to the working  age
12population as instruments). This evidence was interpreted  by FH as
consistent with a low degree of financial integration among OECD
countries during this period.
The findings of FH have been confirmed in broad terms by many
other researchers, using different samples and different empirical
techniques.  Frankel  (1985), for example, regressed time series
observations of decade averages of I/Y on those of S/Y for the US,
using data extending into the nineteenth century and instruments
consisting of the share of military spending in GNP as well as a
measure of the age distribution of the population, and derived an
estimate of 0.96 for b.  Bayoumi (1990) looked at ten industrial
countries over the period 1965-86, estimating b in cross section
for the full period as well as several subperiods, and also found
high values of b, with no pattern over time, whether the estimates
were conducted in levels or first differences.
At  best,  other  investigators have  been  able,  in  certain
samples, to detect values of b statistically different from the
autarky value of unity,  but the point estimates of b continue to be
relatively  high, even among industrial countries with  few legal
barriers  to  capital  movements.  Caprio  and  Howard  (1984), for
example, using the national income  accounting identity  CA =  S-I (CA
denotes the current  account of  the balance of  payments), regressed:
d(CA/Y)  1 /d(S/Y)  i=v.+e  (9)
(where  d is the first difference operator) for a sample of 23 OECD
countries using data drawn from the period 1963-81, but using the
business cycle as the unit of observation (i.e.,  annual data were
averaged  from  cycle  trough  to  cycle  trough).  With  complete
autarky,  mu  should  be  zero,  whereas  with  perfect  financial
integration the value of mu shouldi  be unity.  Their point estimate
of 0.45 was  estimated precisely enough to permit them to reject
both extremes.  "  Consistent with this estimate, their  estimated
value for b in a firt-differenced version of the FH equation was
0.63 which,  though statistically different  from unity  and lower
than that derived by FH, remains surprisingly high.
Earlier, Sachs (1982)  had appeared to obtain results somewhat
less in  accordance with those  of FH.  Sachs estimated the equation:
I  However, when Caprio and Howard estimated the corresponding
version of equation (9)  for investment, i.e., d(CA/Y)/d(I/Y)=mu+e,
rather than the perfect integration  value of -1 for  mu their point
estimate was -0.08, not significantly different from the autarky
value of zero.
13d(CA/Y)  1=c4.fd(I/Y)  1+e  (10)
for a  cross-section  of OECD countries.  Under  perfect  capital
mobility, f should be -1, and in fact Sachs' point estimate was
-0.65,  seemingly  contradicting the  finding  of  almost  complete
financial autarky for these countries in FH.  Dooley and Penati
(1984),  however, found that, whereas regressions of (I/Y)  on (S/Y)
as in FH tended to be stable across various subperiods, those of
(CA/Y)  on (I/Y)  did not.  They proved to be highly sensitive to the
inclusion of data from the decade of the seventies and of certain
outliers among the countries in their sample.  Beyond this, Dooley
and  Penati  addressed  some  of  the  received  wisdom  about  the
increasing financial integration  among industrial countries during
the postwar years.  They argued that, if industrial countries are
indeed  becoming  more  integrated  financially,  them  we  should
observe:
a. That the cross-section  correlation  between I/Y  and S/Y was lower
in the decade of the seventies than that of the fifties.
b. That the correlation in cross-section between CA/Y and I/Y was
small in the decade of the fifties, and negative in the seventies.
c.. That the correlation  between  d(I/Y) and d(S/Y) should be small,
while that between d(CA/Y) and d(I/Y) should be negative.
The found that all of these predictions were rejected by the data.
The view that b has not fallen over  time among  industrial
countries, however, has proven to be somewhat less robust than the
finding that the value of b has been relatively high on average.
Both Obstfeld  (1986)  and Vos (1987) found that b fell after 1973,
contrary to the the results  cited above.  Obstfeld used time series
regressions  based on  quarterly observations of changes in (I/Y)  and
(S/Y) for several OECD countries, while the estimates of Vos were
based on both cross-section and pooled cross section-time series
results.  Vos  obtained  an  estimate of  approximately  0.8  for  b
before 1973, 0.55 for 1973-79, and 0.49 for 1980-84.  Note that,
even in the most recent period used in both of these studies, the
estimate of b remains far from its hypothesized full-integration
value  of  zero.  These  results  are  consistent  with  those  of
Feldstein and Bachetta  (1991), who  found  b declining  from 0.91
during  the  decade  of the sixties to 0.61  during  1980-86 for a
cross-section  sample  of  23  OECD  countries.  The  most  extreme
evidence of a decline in b was provided by Frankel (1991), albeit
only  for  the  US.  Using  cyclically-adjusted  annual  data  and
instrumental  variable  estimation,  he  found  that,  while  b  was
approximately  unity  during  1930-79,  it  became  statistically
indistinguishable from zero during 1980-86.
Although  the  empirical  findings  of  FH  have  thus  proven
14difficult  to  refute,  their  interpretation  of  the  evidence  as
suggesting  that  industrial  countries  are  much  less  integrated
financially  than commonly  believed has not been generally accepted.
The response to  the FH findings  has broadly divided into two camps:
a. Some  analysts  (Harberger  (1980), Caprio  and Howard  (1984),
Murphy (1984),  Tobin (1983)e  Summers (1988),  Obstfeld (1986),  Tesar
(1988) and Bayoumi (1990)) interpret the correlations as simply
uninformative about the degree of capital mobility.  Within this
group,  one  subset  (Harberger,  Caprio  and  Howard,  Murphy,  and
Bayoumi) accepts on the basis of  other  evidence that  financial
integration is indeed high among OECD countries (or at least has
become so recently), and interprets saving-investment correlations
as arising from a variety of other causes.  A second subset (Tobin)
questions  the  degree  of  financial  integration  that  industrial
countries  have  actually  achieved,  but  again  on  the  basis  of
independent evidence.
b.  Another group (Penati  and Dooley (1984),  Frankel (1985),  Dooley,
Frankel,  and Mathieson  (1987), Feldstein  and  Bacchetta  (1991))
accepts  the FH correlations at face value as evidence that domestic
saving and investment can indeed  have direct effects on each other,
as postulated by FH.  Again this group divides into two subsets.
Penati and Dooley, Dooley, Frankel, and Mathieson, and Feldstein
and Bacchetta, interpret the evidence as suggesting that financial
integration is indeed limited among  OECD countries, and develop
explanations that reconcile this view with the evidence for a high
degree  of  capital  mobility  derived  from  other  sources.  More
recently, Frankel (1986), (1991), (1992),  has adopted the view that
the FH evidence reflects imperfect integration in aoods markets,
rather than financial markets.
The first group takes the position that, though zero capital
mobility implies that (I/Y) and (S/Y) would be highly correlated,
the converse is not true --  i.e., national saving and investment
rates could be highly correlated even if world financial markets
are  perfectly  integrated  in  the  sense  defined  previously.
Essentially, this is because national saving is endogenous in the
FH equation - i.e., (S/Y) is correlated with the error term.  The
source of this correlation differs between time series and cross-
section applications.  In time series, the correlation could arise
because:
i. Both  I/Y and S/Y are functions of the  state of the business
cycle - i.e., of a third variable Y/YBAR.  In particular, both I/Y
and S/Y are known to be procyclical.  On analytical grounds, there
is reason  to believe that temporary real shocks, such as to the
productivity  of  domestic  capital  and  labor,  to  the  prices  of
imported  inputs, or  to  world  real  interest  rates,  would  move
domestic saving and investment in the same direction (see Obstfeld
(1986)).
15ii. Governments  could respond to incipient current  account deficits
(increases of I/Y relative to S/Y) by contracting fiscal policy to
achieve a current account target.  Taking national saving as the
sum  of  private  and  public  saving,  this  makes  national  saving
endogenous through its public component.
iii. The country in question could loom large in world financial
markets.  Shocks  to  national  saving  could  thus  affect  world
interest  rates  and  through  them  domestic  investment.  Murphy
(1984), in particular, shows that the high value of b in FH can be
attributed  to  the  inclusion of  three  large countries  (the US,
Japan, and the UK).  When these are removed from the sample, the
value of b falls to approximately 0.6.
In a  cross-section context neither  i nor iii are relevant.
However, national saving and investment rates may both be functions
of the country's long-run growth rate (see Obstfeld (1986)).  The
dependence of national saving on the rate of growth is  a direct and
familiar  implication  of  life-cycle  consumption  theory,  while
steady-state growth implies:
(I/Y)  =  (n + delta)  (K/i).
If (K/Y)  depends on the real interest rate, which is common to all
countries, then (I/Y) is an increasing function of n.
The key difference between the alternative interpretations of
the Feldstein-Horioka results turns on whether phenomena such as
these are taken as full explanations for the observed correlations
between  saving  and  investment  ratios,  leaving  nothing  to  be
explained by the direct effects of either variable on  the other.
The  second  group  takes  the  position  that  saving-investment
correlations have been too large and too robust to  be accounted for
in any of the ways described above.  In part this view is based on
refinements  of  the estimation  technique  to  take  some  of  these
phenomena into account.  Frankel (1986)  addressed the large-country
issue in a time-series study for the US by expressing saving and
investment rates as deviations from rest-of-world rates, reasoning
that under perfect capital mobility a drop in US saving may indeed
crowd out investment  worldwide, but there would be no reason for it
to  do  so  differentially  in  the  US.  Nevertheless,  a  high
correlation  betweeki  US saving and  investment rates expressed in
this form remained during 1970-85.
In  several  papers,  Frankel  develops  an  argument  that
reconciles perfect financial integration as measured by tests of
CIP  and  an  interpretation of saving-investment  correlations  as
reflecting, at least in part, bidirectional causation between the
two variables, as in  FH, rather than merely the common influence of
some  third  domestic factor  or external  feedback through  large-
country effects, as suggested above.  The argument relies  crucially
on the observation that the validity of CIP is compatible with the
16failure of RIP.  As we 'ave seen, this can be achieved if either
UIP or ex ante relative IPP fail.  Since saving and investment both
depend on the domestic real interest rate, and since the domestic
real  interest rate can vary  independently of the world  rate in
spite of CIP, then shocks to either saving or investment  that alter
the domestic real interest rate will cause each variable to affect
the other.  Suppose that UIP holds, but that a temporary exogenous
increase  in  saving  results  in  a  temporary  real  exchange  rate
depreciation (i.e., ex ante relative PPP fails, because the real
exchange  rate  will  be  expected  to  appreciate  in  the  future).
Since,  under  UIP,  this  would  cause  the  expected  domestic  real
interest  rate  to  fall,  investment would  rise,  resulting  in  a
positive  correlation  between  saving  and  investment.  Even  a
permanent saving shock could have this effect, if the initial real
exchange rate depreciation overshot its long-run level.
To summarize, the use of saving-investment correlations to
draw  inferences  about  the  degree  of  financial  integration  is
problematic, because there are at least two ways that saving and
investment could be correlated even if financial markets were well
integrated, in the sense that UIP held exactly:
i. First, I/Y and S/Y could be correlated even if RIP also held,
because  they  are  both  endogenous  variables  which  respond  to
movements in common factors, both in  time series and cross section.
ii. Second, shocks that are specific  to saving or investment  would
also give rise to a positive correlation between the two  variables,
even under UIP, precisely because RIP does not hold.
To the extent that saving-investment correlations arise from this
second source, however, they may nevertheless provide evidence of
the  extent  to  which  exogenous  shifts  in  domestic  saving  or
investment can induce changes in the other variable.  As indicated
in Section I, this is one of the key policy issues motivating a
concern with the degree of financial integration.
5. Euler equation tests
Recently,  Obstfeld  (1986) proposed  an  alternative to  both
arbitrage  conditions and saving-investment  correlations  as  measures
of the degree of financial integration  among countries.  This test
is based  on  the  Euler  equation that  characterizes  the  optimal
intertemporal behavior of consumption,  and amounts  to an attempt to
detect whether residents of different political jurisdictions  have
access to the same risk-free asset.
For  domestic  residents,  the  Euler  equation  for  optimal
intertemporal consumption plans can be written as:
17Et;  (PC/  PC,)  xp  V  (CC.1)  /  U/  =1/  (cc)  +it(11)
for each period t.  Here c denotes real per capita consumption,
beta  is  a  subjective  discount  factor,  and  i  is  the  riskless
interest rate.  The corresponding condition for foreigners is:
st(Stt/StvPtvlxp  U  ^t+X)u  (C)=l/(+it)(12)
where S is the nominal exchange rate and asterisks denote foreign
variables, but the same risk-free rate i applies.  Equations (11)
and  (12) imply that the expected marginal rates of substitution
between current and future units of the domestic currency must be
equal for foreign and domestic residents.  To test this, Obstfeld
assumes that domestic and foreign residents have the same utility
function and that period utility takes the constant relative risk-
aversion form:
u(Cc)  -a  a  ¢(13)
Under these circumstances, one can define the variable:
n=  t)  (c pe  )_(  )  d (  SfPe  (14) cc+ 1 Pt.  4S  C&1t:
and the equality of the expected marginal rates of substitution
becomes:
E,n,=0  (15)
In  other  words,  n, should  be  expected  to  be  zero  based  on
information available before it is observed --  i.e., no variable
contained in the information set available prior to time t should
help to predict the time-t value of n.
Obstfeld (1986)  used a grid of values for the parameter a to
construct quarterly time series for n,  over the period 1962:II to
1985:II using Japan and Germany  as the foreign  countries and the US
as the domestic country.  He tested for perfect capital mobility
18between each of these two pairs of countries by testing whether
past  values  of  nt  (which  would  of  course  be  in  the  time-t
information set) helped predict its current value, using tests of
exclusion restrictions.  He found that, though the null hypothesis
of zero coefficients on past nt's  could be rejected over the whole
sample  (a finding which  is inconsistent with  perfect  financial
integration during  the period as a whole), it  could not be rejected
at conventional significant levels between the US and Japan after
1973:I, suggesting that the two countries became highly integrated
financially after that time.
This  test posseses several attractive  features compared  to
those that have considered above.  Unlike arbitrage tests of CIP or
UIP, it does not require comparisons between rates of return on
what might be dissimilar assets, and unlike tests of RIP the null
of strong  financial integration would  not be rejected due  to a
failure of ex ante relative PPP.  Furthermore, unlike FH tests it
is  not  vulnerable  to  indirect  sources  of  saving-investment
correlations.  Moreover, it focuses specifically on what is meant
by weak financial integration  --  i.e., that residents in different
political jurisdictions  be  able to trade the same asset on the same
terms.  The  disadvantage  of  this  test,  of  course,  is  that
restrictive assumptions are equired to implement it --  i.e., the
underlying consumption model must be correct for both countries,
and  cross-country  differences  in  utility  functions  must  be
negligible.  Because  the  test  therefore  embodies  multiple
hypotheses, rejections may be difficult to interpret.  Finally, as
:n  the  case  of  arbitrage  tests,  statistically  significant
rejections may not be economically important if ne is small  on
average.
IV. Empirical tests of capital mobility for developing countries
As indicated in  the introduction,  developing countries tend to
be treated, in  both policy  and analytical work, as either closed to
capital  flows  (except perhaps for nonmarket-based  lending  from
official sources or bank lending to their public sectors) or as
completely open, with domestic interest rates bound by UIP to the
levels prevailing internationally.  The motivation for the former
is that the vast majority of developing countries maintain formal
legal restrictions on capital movements.  According to the IMF's
1991  Annual  Report  on  Exchange  Arrangements  and  Exchange
Restrictions, out of  136 member developing  countries,  113 were
classified as maintaining formal restrictions on capital account
transactions.  Yet, in spite of such controls, various types of
evidence  suggest  that  many  developing  countries  are  far  from
financially closed.  This section reviews the available evidence,
which takes the form of indications of the size of gross  flows,
tests of interest  parity conditions,  tests of the effectiveness of
sterilization,  and  some  limited  evidence  on  saving-investment
correlations.
191. The magnitude of gross flows
To the extent that the size of capital flows is indicative of
the degree of financial integration, evidence on past episodes of
substantial capital movements in and out of developing countries
can  be brought  to  bear  on  the  issue.  In  Latin  America,  for
example, the  recent  past has witnessed  several  episodes during
which capital flows in  both directions have been sufficienvly large
as to become the focus of policy  concern.  These include the period
of substantial  external  debt accumulation  during 1974-82,  the large
short-term  capital  inflows  associated  with  the  Southern  Cone
stabilization  programs  in  1978-82,  the  gross  private  capital
outflows  associated with  the  "capital  flight"  phenomenon  which
afflicted several Latin  American countries during the first half of
the eighties and, more recently, a  widespread resurgence of capital
inflows,  primarily  to  the  private  sector,  during  1990-91  (see
Calvo, Leiderman, and Reinhart (1991)).
Except for the most recent capital-inflow episode, each of
these events  has generated a substantial  literature which documents
the extent to  which these economies have been financially linked  to
the world capital market.  One way  to summarize the implications of
these capital-flow episodes is to measure, at a point in time, the
gross stocks of financial claims between developing countries and
external financial markets to which they have given rise.  For the
group of fifteen heavily-indebted developing countries, the stock
of gross external debt as of 1988 amounted to about 75 percent of
GDP.9  For the same year, Rojas-Suarez (1990) estimated that the
total  external  claims  of  a  very  similar  group  of  developing
countries, overwhelmingly acquired in the form of private capital
flight, amounted to about two-thirds of their external debt, or
about half of GDP.  Rojas-Suarez found a high correlation between
the  stock  of  flight  -apital and  a  measure  of  default  risk,
corroborating the findings of others (e.g., Cuddington (1986) and
Dooley  (1986)) who  have  linked  private  capital  outflows  from
developing countries to  portfolio considerations.  Thus, the gross-
flow evidence, which unfortunately is available only for the major
indebted developing countries, indicates that these countries have
exhibited  a  substantial  amount  of  at  least  de  facto  financial
openness.
2. Tests of interest parity conditions
a. Covered and uncovered nominal interest parity
Lizondo (1983)  conducted tests of both CIP and UIP for  Mexico,
using monthly data over the period  1977-80.  Based on standard
tests,  he  was  able to  reject the  joint  hypothesis  of  UIP  and
rational expectations,  whether using the one-month forward rate or
9  See Montiel (1992).  The countries in the group consist of
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spot rate.  However, because of the  "peso  problem" he did  not
interpret  these  rejections  as  necesarily  invalidating UIP  for
Mexico during this period.  In testing CIP, Lizondo followed the
methodology of Frenkel and Levich (1975), computing neutral bands
around CIP based on estimated transactions  costs and tabulating the
number of observations of domestic interest  rater lying outside
those bands during the period.  He found that percentage to be
extremely high,  ranging  from 75 percent  for one-month Treasury
bills to 96 percent for three-month time deposits.  Lizondo was
able  to  account  for  this  rejection  of  CIP  in terms  of  legal
regulations consisting of prior deposit restrictions on forward
transactions and taxes  on foreign exchange  capital gains.  The
upshot  is  that,  though  unexploited  profit  opportunities  were
apparently absent, domestic rates could depart substantially from
their  CIP  counterparts  in  Mexico  during  this  period.  More
recently, however, Khor and Rojas-Suarez (1991)  found that, during
1987 to 1990, yields on dollar-indexed Mexican government bonds
were  cointegrated  with  yields  to  maturity  on  Mexican  public
external debt traded in the secondary market.  This suggests that
Mexico's degree of integration  with external financial markets may
have increased in recent years.
Results similar to those of Lizondo for Mexico were obtained
by  Phylaktis  (1988)  for  Argentina  during  1971-84.  Using  the
methodology of Dooley and Isard (1980),  she was able to account for
83 percent of the quarterly variance of the differential between
the 3-month domestic deposit rate and its UIP counterpart  (using
the  US  as  the  reference  country)  through  the  use  of  standard
portfolio variables and step dummies for capital controls.  The
implication is that, while foreign financial variables influenced
domestic interest rates in Argentina during this period (i.e.,  the
economy was financially open), foreign and domestic assets were
imperfect substitutes (strong financial integration did not hold)
and certain types of capital controls proved to be effective in
increasing the differential between foreign and domestic rates of
return.
In a  departure from  the standard  methodology, Edwards and  Khan
(1985) postulated  that  the actual  domestic  interest rate  in a
developing country could be expressed as a weighted average of the
external  (UIP) rate  and  the domestic  interest  rate  that  would
prevail in a financially closed economy.  The latter  was expressed
as a function of the excess money supply and the expected rate of
inflation.  When the determinants of the closed-economy interest
rate are substituted into the weighted average expression for the
domestic  interest rate,  the  result  is  a  reduced-form  interest
"parity"  condition which expresses the domestic interest rate as a
function  not  only  of  the  external  rate,  but  also  of  domestic
monetary conditions.  This approach,  then, in effect uses domestic
monetary variables to explain the "risk premium".  Estimating this
reduced form makes  it possible to detect  any  influence of the
21domestic monetary variables on the domestic interest  rate.  If UIP
holds continuously, such variables should have no explanatory  power
in the reduced form.  By contrast, if the economy is completely
closed,  the  UIP  variable  should  not  enter.  Edwards and  Khan
estimated this model using quarterly data  for Colombia (1968-82).
and  Singapore  (1976-83).  They  found  that  -or  Colombia  both
external  and  domestic  variables  mattered,  making  this  economy
"semi-open",  while for  Singapore only the UIP foreign  interest rate
helped to explain the domestic interest rate, as would have been
expected under strong financial integration.
A serious difficulty inhibiting tests of interest parity for
large groups of developing countries is that many ouch countries
engage  in  "financial  repression"  --  i.e.,  the  practice  of
subjecUing interest rates in  the formal financial system  to binding
legal constraints.  Thus published interest rates in  such countries
do not tend  to apply to assets with  market-determined rates  of
return.  Though "informal"  credit markets tend to arise outside the
controlled financial system, with interest rates that are free to
respond to the forces of supply and demand, data on such rates is
rarely available.  In these circumstances, inferences about the
extent  to which  market-clearing interest  rates  in the domestic
financial system are affected by world financial conditions become
difficult to draw.
Recently, Haque and Montiel (1991)  adapted the  methodology of
Edwards and Khan to allow testing of UIP under such circumstances.
Retaining  the  assumption  that the  (unoberved) domestic market-
clearing interest rate is a stable  weighted average  of the autarky
rate and the UIP rate, they were  able to estimate the relevant
weights by substituting the resulting expression for the market-
clearing rate into the money-demand function and estimating the
resulting  nonlinear  function of observable  variables.  In this
estimation,  the weight  corresponding to the UIP emerges as the
coefficient of this variable in the estimate of the money-demand
function.  This coefficient, which is bounded between zero and one,
indicates  the  degree  of  financial  integration,  with  values
approaching  unity  being  indicative  of  perfect  financial
integration.  Haque  and  Montiel's  results  for  15  developing
countries during the period 1969-87 are reported in  Table 1.  In 10
of the 15 cases reported, the weight of the UIP rate could not be
statistically distinguished  from  the perfect capital  mobility  value
of unity.  For four countries in  the sample (Brazil,  Jordan, Malta,
and  Turkey)  an  intermediate  degree  of  financial  integration
prevailed during this period.  The financial autarky value of zero
failed to be rejected in only one case (that of India).  Overall,
these  results  are  consistent  with  a  substantial  degree  of
integration  with  external  financial  markets  for  the  countries
considered.
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Parameter for 15 Developing Countries
Brazil  0.723a  Morocco  0.877b
Guatemala  0.708b  Philippines  0.577b
India  0.158c  Sri Lanka  0.638b
Indonesia  0.865b  Tunisia  0.833b
Jordan  0.500a  Turkey  0.525a
Kenya  0.600b  Uruguay  0.890b
Malaysia  0.638b  Zambia  1.019b
Malta  0.411a
a: Significantly different from both zero and one.
b: Significantly different from zero, but not from one.
b: Significantly different from one, but not from zero.
The Edwards-Khan and Haque-Montiel methodology was applied to
Korea and Taiwan by Reisen and Yeches  (1991) and to Thailand by
Robinson (1991).  The former  used quarterly data for the decade of
the eighties and direct observations on the curb market interest
rate in these countries, finding a weight of 0.594 on the UIP rate
in Korea  and  0.353 in Taiwan during  this  period, in each  case
distinguishable from zero and unity.  This places these countries
among the intermediate group above.  Kalman filter  tests suggested
that the degree of integration  peaked for Korea during the period
1981-84, but was relatively constant for Taiwan over the decade.
Robinson's  findings for Thailand were similar, with a weight for
the UIP of 0.590 during 1978-90.
Tests for changes in the degree of financial intearation due
to domestic  financial liberalization in Pacific Basin countries
were also conducted by Faruqee (1991).  Using monthly observations
on money-market interest rates,  the latter constructed time series
on  the  differentials  between  such  rates  in  Korea,  Malaysia,
Singapore and Thailand and the three-month Japanese yen LIBOR rate
during the period 1978:9  to 1990:12. Mean differentials were large
and positive  for Korea  and Thailand, but  not for Singapore and
Malaysia.  In all four countries,  both the mean and variance of the
differentials decreased in the second half of the sample period.
Time series modeling of the differentials revealed a statistically
significant positive constant for Korea and Thailand only, and the
Korean differentials exhibited a significant negative trend over
the  period.  Mean-reverting  behavior  was  weak  in  all  four
countries.  Because  the residuals from the ARMA estimates  exhibited
smaller  variability  in the second  half  of  the period, Faruqee
reestimated  the  time  series  models  using  an  autoregressive
23conditional heteroskedasticity (ARCH) approach and found that the
variance of shocks  to the ARMA residuals declined monotonically for
Singapore, but not for the remaining countries.  In all  cases,
however, the variance of shocks was smaller in 1990 than it had
been  in  1980,  leading  Faruqee to  conclude  that  the  degree  of
financial integration increased in these countries over the decade
of the eighties.
3. Tests of monetary autonomy
In the developing-country context, tests of the effectiveness
of  sterilization  have  focused  on  estimates  of  the  "offset
coefficient" that relates changes in the stock of domestic assets
of  the  central bank  to  changes  in reserve  flows.  As  already
indicated (see Section III), under strong financial integration,
this coefficient should  iave  a value of -1, since any expansion of
the  domestic  assets  of  the central bank  will  give  rise  to  an
offsetting capital outflow, leaving the stock of money unchanged
and implying a loss of monetary autonomy.  The early literature on
this subject, following the monetary approach to the balance of
payments, invariably confirmed an offset coefficient of -1 and a
loss of monetary autonomy.  However, this work proved beset by a
number  of  methodological  problems  which  undermined  the
interpretation  of  this  finding  as  suggestive  of  high  capital
mobility (see Kreinin and  Officer (1978)).
More  recent  work  by  Cumby  and  Obstfeld  (1984), using  a
structural  model  of  the Mexican  financial  sector, found  that,
during the decade of the seventies, strong financial integration
did not hold between Mexico and the United States.  Slow portfolio
adjustment and imperfect asset  substitutability  permitted  Mexico to
retain  at  least  some  short-run  monetary  autonomy  during  this
period.  Within a quarter, only 30-50 percent of a domestic credit
increase was found to leak abroad via capital outflows.  Rennhack
and Modino  (1988) applied the Cumby-Obstfeld model to Colombia,
using quarterly data drawn from 1975 to 1985, with very similar
results:  the within-quarter  offset  coefficient amounted to  about 40
percent, and  monetary autonomy  was at least partially retained even
in the  long run.  By contrast, the  same approach yielded very
different results in the case of Malaysia during 1978-81, where
Bini (1982) found a 70 percent offset to changes in the stock of
domestic credit within the first month.
An implicition of the retention of monetary autonomy is, of
course,  that  policy-induced  changes  in  domestic  financial
aggregates  will  affect  macroeconomic  variables  other  than  the
capital  account.  Thus the detection of  domestic macroeconomic
effects arisin' from monetary policy shocks under fixed exchange
rates  provides an indirect confirmation of  the retention of at
least some degree of monetary autonomy.  While this means that any
evidence that monetary policy can affect domestic macroeconomic
24variables  is of potential  relevance  to  the  issue of  financial
integration,  it is  obviulsly impossible to review all such evidence
here.  One way to narrow  the field is to restrict attention to work
which explicitlv tests whether monetary policy can influence the
domestic interest rate against 'he alternative that the domestic
interest  rate is  determ4ned by UIP.  Boschen and Newman (1989), for
example,  found  that  real  interest  rates  in  Argentina  were
significantly affected by unanticipated monetary growth during the
period 1976:7  to 1982:6,  with little  evidence of a role for foreign
interest rates.
A recent approach to the detection of monetary autonomy which
does not rely on structural estimates of offset coefficients  is
based on causality tests.  In the absence of monetary autonomy
under  fixed  exchange  rates  (i.e.,  under  perfect  financial
integration),  domestic financial  aggregates such as  money or credit
should  not Granger-cause movements  in nominal  income.  Montiel
(1989)  and Dowla and Chowdhury (1991) have tested this hypothesis
for a number of developing countries.  The former used annual data
for twelve countries during 1962-86, and rclied on VARs including
broad money, domestic credit, international reserves, and nominal
income.  Money or credit was found to Granger-cause nominal income
in Bolivia, Chile, Ghana, Indonesia, Mexico, Morocco, Peru,  and
Sierra  Leone, but not in India, Pakistan, Turkey, or Sudan.  Dowla
and  Chowdhury  used  quarterly  data  for  thirteen  countries  over
sample periods of varying length during 1957-89. They found that
some domestic  financial aggregate  (Ml, M2,  or domestic credit)
Granger-caused  domestic  real  output  in  Greece,  Cote  d'Ivoire,
Jordan, Korea, Malawi, Mexico, Singapore, and Tunisia, but not in
Bangladesh, India, Israel, Malaysia, and Pakistan.
4. Saving-investment correlations
Most of the literature that followed Feldstein and Horioka
focused on industrial countries.  However, several investigators
(Dooley,  Frenkel, and Mathieson (1986),  Summers (1988)) included a
number of developing countries in their cross-section samples and
considered the effect of including such countries on  their results.
Surprisingly,  these authors  concurred in finding that the inclusion
of  developing  countries  reduced  the  strength  of  the  saving-
investment correlation  in their samples.  This  was unexpected,
since these countries were perceived ex ante as less integrated
with world capital markets than industrial countries.
The  only  study  to  date  which has  focused specifically  on
developing countries is Wong (1988),  who looked at a cross-section
sample of 45 developing countries using annual data averaged over
the period  1975-81.  Wong's  results were  consistent with  those
cited  above.  For  his  full  sample,  the  saving  ratio  has  no
statistically significant effect on the  investment ratio.  When
five extreme observations were excluded, b took on a value of about
0.6, statistically different from both the autarky value of unity
25and the perfect integration value of zero, but still substantially
below what other investigators  had found for industrial countries.
Wong separated his sample into two groups based on the import-GDP
ratio as an inverse proxy for the size of the traded goods sector
and found that the group with the lower import-GDP ratio exhibited
a  higher  value  of  b,  consistent  with  the  Frenkel  (1985)
interpretation  of  the  FH  correlation  emphasizing  lack  of
integration  in goods  markets.  Finally, Wong  produced  indirect
evidence  both  for  and  against  the  use  of  saving-investment
correlations as indices of capital mobility.  On the one hand, he
found that independently constructed indices of the severity of
capital controls affected the coefficient b in the direction to be
expected if b were  a true indicator of the degree of financial
integration.  On the other hand, he found that, though the average
size of current account  imbalances increased  for this group  of
countries between 1966-72 and 1975-81,  the parameter b proved to be
stable across the two periods.
5. Summary
The existing evidence for developing countries suggests that
few, if  any, of these countries can be considered to be financially
closed.  Even  in  the  case  of  India,  where  the  Haque-Montiel
methodology is unable to reject the null hypothesis of financial
autarky, some contrary evidence exists  in the form of a similar
inability  to  reject  the  proposition  that  the  major  financial
aggregates  do  not  Granger-cause  real  output.  Elsewhere  the
evidence of financial openness is stronger.
For countries such as Argentina, Colombia, Indonesia, Korea,
Mexico, Morocco,.  and Thailand, tests of arbitrage relationships
indicate that external (UIP) interest rates play an important, but
not necessarily  exclusive,  role  in affecting  domestic  interest
rates,  suggesting that, while these economies should  be regarded as
financially open, the strong form of financial integration  has not
held.  Several other types of evidence are consistent with this
conclusion for  these countries.  For example, gross flows have been
large (in the form of both debt and capital flight) in Argentina,
Colombia, and Mexico, yet independent  evidence of the retention of
monetary autonomy is available for all three countries.  Similarly,
though  arbitrage tests cannot  rule  out strong financial integration
in Indonesia and Morocco, domestic financial aggregates are found
to Granger-cause  domestic activity  in both  countries.  Brazil,
Jordan, Malta, and Turkey may also be in this group.
At the other extreme, the evidence suggests that Guatemala,
Malaysia,  and  Singapore  may  represent  instances  of  financial
integration in the strong sense.  Arbitrage tests are consistent
with this conclusion, and tests  of monetary autonomy  do not provide
contrary evidence for either Guatemala or Malaysia.
For  the majority  of developing  countries,  however,  formal
26tests of financial integration have either not been conducted or
only  very  limited  evidence  is  available.  Saving-investment
correlations and  consumption-based  tests have simply  not made their
way  to  the  developing-country literature.  Thus,  the  bits  and
pieces  of  evidence  on  financial  integration  that  exist  for
developing countries do not lend themselves to drawing systematic
conclusions for any but a  very few countries.  Existing tests have
been applied in limited fashion, over disparate periods of time,
and use very different methodologies.  To gain a  more comprehensive
perspective, it is desirable to unify this piecemeal evidence by
applying the existing approaches to the measurement of financial
integration  in a uniform fashion to large  samples of developing
countries over similar periods of time.  This is undertaken in the
next section.
V. Some Tests for Developing Countries
In  this  section,  I  apply  four  of  the  tests  described
previously to measure capital mobility during the decade of the
eighties in a large number of individual  developing countries.  The
samples  in  each  case  are  comprised  of  the  largest groups  of
developing countries for which the relevant data could be acquired
conveniently.  The four tests consist of measures of gross capital
flows,  saving-investment  correlations,  tests  of  arbitrage
conditions, and Euler equation tests.  In view of the discussion in
Section III, I would consider these to have been listed, at least
conceptually, in order of increasing reliability as indicators of
the degree of financial integration in  the sense defined  here.  All
of these  tests have shortcomings of varying degrees of severity,
which I will discuss below.  The hope is that, by using a battery
of  tests, a coherent picture may emerge for some countries, though
each  test  individually  may  provide  a  noisy  indicator.  Some
problems,  however,  apply  to more  than  one  test.  Particularly
important for the last three regression-based tests, the degree of
capital  mobility  is  treated  as  constant  over  the  period  of
estimation.  Thus, recent changes  in financial openness  cannot hope
to be captured by measures of this sort.
1. Gross capital flows
By analogy with measures of commercial  openness derived by
expressing the sum  (or the average) of exports and imports as a
ratio to GDP, the first measure to be constructed consists of the
value of capital transactions in the balance of payments (average
of inflows and outflows) expressed as a fraction of GDP.  This has
not only the conceptual problem associated with measures of gross
flows  described  in  Section II, but  also  some  very  substantial
empirical problems.
In particular,  the measure could  be  very sensitive to the
level of  aggregation at which  it is constructed  --i.e.,  to the
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data.  To the extent that published data  are reported on a net
basis, of course, the size of gross flows will be understated, and
differences among countries in the size of such flows underlying
the net data will distort cross-country  comparisons.  This would be
a  problem,  for example, where  annual  balance  of payments  data
record  changes  in gross  stocks  during  the  course of  the  year,
rather  than  all  transactions that  took  place  during  the  year.
Thus,  for example, if a  short term capital outflow is reversed
during  the year,  a capital-outflow measure  which relied  on the
change in the stock of short-term liabilities during the course of
the  year  would  record  neither  the  initial  outflow  nor  the
subsequent  inflow,  and  would  thus  underreport  the  volume  of
transactions  between domestic  and  foreign  residents during  the
year.  Nevertheless, this measure may be worth examining as the
only  available  indicator  of  the  volume  of  capital-account
transactions for developing countries.  To the extent  that reported
capital-account transactions  in  the balance  of payments  reflect the
true underlying volume of  transactions,  this indicator  has the dual
virtues that it serves as a  (crude) check on prior beliefs both
across  countries  and  over  time,  as  well  as  that  it  can  be
constructed year by year.
Table 2  reports the values of  this indicator for 88 developing
countries.  In column 2 of this table the ratio of the mean value
of capital inflows and outflows to GDP is  averaged over the period
1980-89 (the last year for which data were available for a  large
group of countries)." 0 An  interesting contrast emerges in this
table between capital and commercial flows.  The standard measure
of commercial openness (the ratio of the average value of exports
and imports of goods and services to GDP)  is  reported in column 1
of  Table  2.  As is evident from a casual comparison of the first
two  columns,  commercial  flows are  much  larger  for  almost  all
countries  in this group than are reported capital flows" 1. The
average values of these variables for the group as a whole appear
at the end of the list of countries.  Commercial flows amounted to
almost 45 percent of GDP  for the group as a whole, while capital
flows represented only 12 percent of GDP.  By  this measure, then,
developing countries would seem to be much less open financially
than  they  are  commercially.  However,  this  conclusion  is  not
10  The  data were  taken  from the  IMF's  Balance of  Payments
Yearbook.  The sum of all inflows and outflows, using the finest
classification available to avoid netting, was divided by two and
converted  into domestic  currency using  the  World  Bank's  ATLAS
exchange rate to smooth the effects of changes in exchange rates.
This  was  then  divided by GDP  as  reported  in the Bank's  World
Tables.
"  The  sole  e,xception is  Nicaragua,  a  country  which  was
undergoing a civil war for much of this pericI.
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Algeria  24.94  7.34  6.22  9.01
Antlgua  99.72  20.21  19.09  19.89
Bahamas.  The  70.84  3.84  3.54  3.00
Bahrain  115.94  11.18  9.53  12.09
Bangladesh  13.41  3.79  3.77  3.57
Barbados  62.48  8.08  7.38  6.58
BoliMa  29.46  1  6.67  18.1  0  1  1.28
Botswana  88.73  10.02  11.02  9.07
Brazil  11t.75  7.77  9.60  6.94
Buridna  Faso  21.74  4.45  4.92  5.01
Cape  Verde  44.15  6.38  7.83  4.20
Central  Afican  Rep.  29.73  6.31  8.37  3.41
Chad  25.02  5.46  6.31  8.80
Chile  32.03  16.70  24.18  13.63
Colombia  17.88  5.89  7.5S  6.25
Congo  59.48  31.64  32.43  32.80
Costa  Rlca  41  .29  20.28  17.03  14.86
Cote  d'lvoire  40.66  15.07  14.15S  17.58
Cyprus  58.85  9.69  9.74  10.10
Dominica  64.25  &8.8  8.04  13.12
DomInican  Rep.  31.21  6.63  5.72  5.55
Ecuador  28.07  19.73  20.49  20.32
Egypt.  Arab  Rep.  33.16  8.55  7.52  7.62
El  Salvador  28.92  7.67  7.31  5.48
EthiopIa  17.34  4.10  4.44  5.02
Flji  51.1  8  8.10  6.69  8.S6
Gabon  54.63  15.93  1  6.25  21.05
Gamnbia,  The  61.39  17.02  19.78  17.48
Ghana  20.6S  6.74  7.98  7.11
Grenada  68.46  10.14  7.90  14.47
Guatemala  18.80  6.66  6.93  8.28
Guinea-Blssau  28.82  18.07  21.59  31.38
Haiti  32.25  3.63  3.80  3.12
Honduras  34.01  10.06  9.59  10.87
India  8.49  1.60  1.51  2.31
Indonesia  26.99  4.96  4.45  7.15
Israel  4S.94  12.90  11.86  10.39
Jamaica  60.91  '4.39  33.81  22.8t
Kenya  29.16  5.59  5.50  6.51
Korea,  Rep.  of  38.67  o.42  5.27  4.25
Kuwait  68.68  19.47  20.07  1  9.98Table 2  ataios  of  Trade  and Gross Caprtal  Flows  to GOP  (Cantd.)
(in per,cent)
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Lesotho  131.66  1587  1309  17.32
Libya  41.53  E38  232  10Q01
Madagascar  19.2  1Q76  a63  14.45
Malaysia  6243  a1o  10.o  a88
Mall  2a59  6973  7.57  8.25
Maurntania  61.36  17.91  1933  1683
Maunrrus  59.00  7.04  678  7.38
Mexico  17.40  9.01  9.05  6S8
Morocco  28aos  7.23  6.86  5.56
Nicaragua  29.76  29.48  2361  38.03
Niger  26.29  a77  a44  7.18
Nigena  21.37  9223  6a65  2Q18
Pahistan  1a45  a5s  a46  4.58
Panama  154.22  14a16  7a85  18653
Papua  New  Guinea  51.33  1298  11.06  970
Paraguay  2535  a48  a82s  11.00
Philippines  2a51  7.94  9.77  9.09
Rwanda  19.49  a34  a38  a42
Sao Tcme and Princip  51.79  2aeo  3349  14.25
St lKtts and Nevis  75C0  1503  1299  1879
St  Lucia  7510  11.81  8.43  11.64
St Vncent  79.43  677  EB8  9.25
Saudi Arabia  sao2  1208  11.09  10.54
Senega  39.88  11.36  1083  a936
Seycrieiles  74.92  11.75  1355  11.00
Sierra Leone  21.08  1205  1a95  1235
Singapore  191.48  21.15  2299  2ao7
Somalia  41.09  1238  11.77  16.33
South AInca  3Q22  ze8  a25  1.71
Sri  LanKa  3556  9.15  a14  1Q37
Sudan  1506  4.28  a32  a98
Surname  4820  4.21  a11  697
Swazland  99.46  1a74  1a48  1917
Synan  Arab  Rep.  2a94  .19  5.45  B126
Tanzania  20Q06  9.57  1a47  1270
Thaland  31.48  920  6.45  604
Togo  5a.65  17.40  1620  14.12
Tonga  5a54  4.62  a97  a13
Trinidad  and Tobago  4a97  7.67  6.33  1a79
Tunisia  4259  .o05  se5  9.25
Turkey  2a71  636  7.24  7.01
Uganca  2218  10aC3  a02  1203
Uruguay  2504  aG4  4.57  965
Venezuela  26.29  1648  a3e  9.04
Western Samoa  47.24  567  5.42  4.06
Zaire  2S30  9.29  a11  1228
Zamoia  41.64  18.3  2a94  2a88
Average  44.89  11.90  11.27  1a12warranted, since the "netting out" problem described above does not
apply to commercial transactions, imlpying that the two measures
are not directly comparable.
It  is  interesting  to  note  that  little  movement  in  the
direction of increased financial openness is evident over time in
these data.  For most countries, the capital flow ratio exhibits
little change between 1984-86 (column 3) and 1987-89 (column 4).
The slight increase in the average between these periods for the
group as a whole is largely accounted for by the extreme values
reached in Paiiama  during the latter period.
The distribution of capital  flow ratios  for this  group  of
countries is skewed to the right.  Eight countries exhibit ratios
in excess of 20 percent, 13 countries are in the range below 20 but
above 15 percent, 15 countries are below 15 but above 10 percent,
39 countries are found between 10 and 5 percent, and the remaining
13 countries have ratios below 5 percent.  Panama and India are at
the extremes of the distribution, with capital flows substantially
exceeding GDP  in the  former  and amounting  to only about  1  1/2
percent of GDP in the latter.  This figure for India is consistent
with  the  finding in the  previous  section  that  tests  of  parity
conditions could not rule out financial autarky for this country.
The group of countries that registered capital flows in excess of
a  fifth of their GDP included, in addition to Panama, Antiq'ua,  the
Congo, Costa Rica, Jamaica, Nicaragua, Sao Tome and Principe, as
well as Singapore.  Again,  the  inclusion of the  latter in this
group is consistent with evidence of a  high degree of financial
integration for this country in existing studies.  Neither Malaysia
nor Guatemala, however, which also appeared highly integrated with
external  financial markets  on  the  basis  of  existing  evidence,
scored very highly on this particular index of openness.  Both of
these  countries  were  in  the  modal  range  of  5-10  percent.
Interestingly, all of the countries taken to be in  the intermediate
group in the previous section were also found in this range.  If
these countries are used as a benchmark and the gross capital flow
ratio is used as an indicator, this implies that the overwhelming
majority  of  countries  in  the  sample  exhibit  at  least  an
intermediate  degree  of integration  with external financial markets.
The exceptions are the Bahamas, Bangladesh, Burkina Faso, Haiti,
India, Indonesia, Pakistan, Rwanda, South Africa, Sudan, Suriname,
and Tonga, where gross flows represented less than five percent of
GDP.
2. Saving-investment correlations
In  spite  of  the  interpretation  problems  posed  by  saving-
investment  correlations  a  la  Feldstein-Horioka  as  indices  of
capital mobility (see Section III), it is useful to examine what
information such  correlations can provide about capital  mobility in
developing  countries.  Where  the  data  are  available,  such
29correlations can be calculated at low cost, and the coefficient b
derived from  time series  estimates of Feldstein-Horioka regressions
at  least  represents  a  straightforward  index  of  the  degree  of
capital  mobility  that  can  in  principle  be  compared  across
countries.  12
The  first  column  of  Table  3  presents  the  estimates  of  b
derived  from  standard  Feldstein-Horioka  regressions  in  levels
(i.e., as in equation  (8)), using ordinary least squares, for a
sample of 62  developing countries for which data on national saving
and gross domestic investment were available in the World Bank's
World Tables during the period 1970-199013.  Of the 62 countries
in the sample, 10 produced such imprecise estimates of b that they
could not be statistically distinguished from either zero or unity
at the  95 percent confidence  level.  Of the remaining  52, 14
yielded  estimates  of  b  that  could  not  be  statistically
distinguished  from  the closed-economy  value  of  unity, yet  were
different  from  zero  at  the  95  percent  confidence  level.  By
contrast, 12 countries were at the other extreme --  i.e., with b
not different  from zero but distinguishable  from one at the  95
percent confidence level.  The remaining 26 countries were in an
intermediate  position.  Using the  small industrial-country  value of
0.6 derived by Murphy  (1984) as well as by Caprio and Howard  (see
Section III) as a benchmark, we find that 19 of the countries in
this last group produced point estimates of b below what might be
considered  a  "representative"  industrial-country value.  Thus,
consistent with what has been found by others, the FH methodology
applied  to  this  group  of  countries  appears  to  suggest  a
surprisingly high degree  of capital mobility  in the majority of
developing countries in this sample.
Recall, moreover, that one explanation for the high degree of
correlation  between  national  saving  and  investment  rates  in
industrial  countries ha-,  been  the endogeneity  of saving  in OLS
regressions.  Thus the estimates above may be biased upward.  To
address  this potential problem, the FH regressions  were reestimated
with  instrumental  variables,  using  the  share  of  government
consumption in GNP and (one  minus) the population dependency ratio
as instruments for the saving rate.  The results are reported in
column  4 of Table  3.  Because data on the  instruments were not
available for some countries, the sample size in this case dropped
to 56.  Surprisingly, the instrumental-variable correction did not
12  As indicated in  Section IV,  time series-based FH regressions
have not previously been reported for large samples of developing
countries.
13Though  the  focus here  is on  the  decade  of the  eighties,
restricting the sample period to this decade would have left too
few degrees of freedom in this case, which  requires regressions
based on annual time series.
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the saving rate appreciably.  Thirteen countries yielded estimates
of b that were too imprecise to be useful in this case, and the
remainder were approximately evenly split between those with b not
statistically different from unity (19 countries) and those with
estimated values either not different from zero (12 countries) or
below the benchmark of 0.6 (9 countries)."
Several of the  studies that have  addressed the  Feldstein-
Horioka results in the industrial country context have estimated
regressions of investment on saving in first differences.  While
these papers have not always provided a rationale for doing so, a
strong  case  can  be  made  that  this  is  indeed  the  appropriate
procedure  (see below).  In  any  case,  to  the  extent  that  the
reasoning underlying the test is  valid, the results should hold as
well in first differences, and re-running the regressions in this
form at the very least provides a test of robustness.  Estimates of
b using first-difference regressions are reported in columns  (2)
(for  the OLS regressions)  and (5) (for  the IV regressions) of Table
3.  Casual  inspection of  these columns  in comparison  with  the
results  of  the  regressions  in  levels,  suggests  that  the  FH
regressions do not pass the robustness test.  Estimates  of b change
sharply for individual  countries in  the majority of cases.  If b is
taken  as  an  indicator  of  a  country's  degree  of  financial
integration with the outside world during this period of time, it
would  appear  that  several  countries  could  be  classified  as
effectively  closed  or  almost  perfectly  integrated  financially
depending  on  whether  the  estimate  of  b  was  derived  from  a
regression estimated in levels or first differences.
A possible reason for this result is that the  regressions
based on levels  of the variables may be producing spurious results.
The valid  reason  to  estimate  in first differences  rather  than
levels is that the saving and investment ratios entering the FH
regressions may be nonstationary variables.  If they are, and they
are not cointegrated, then  a  regression  in levels may  lead to
spurious correlation  (see Granger and Newbold  (1974)).  Indeed,
this  may  provide  an  alternative  interpretation  for  the  high
correlations between domestic saving and  investment observed  in
industrial-country data.  If each of these variables possesses a
single  unit  root,  then  first-differencing  would  render  them
stationary and regressions based on changes would not exhibit the
spurious correlation problem.  As it happens, the null hypothesis
of a single unit root cannot be rejected for any of the saving and
"'  I exclude Burundi, Madagascar, and Venezuela from any of
these categories because the point estimates of b for each of them
was estimated with high confidence to be outside the theoretically
prescribed range of zero to unity.
31investment ratios in this data set.' 5 Thus the regressions based
on levels of the variables are inappropriate in this case.
However, the first-difference regressions may themselves be
misspecified.  If the saving and investment ratios for individual
countries are cointegrated, then the relationship between them can
be  given  an error-correction representation  (Engle and  Granger
(1987)).  In this case, estimating in first differences  has the
effect of omitting the error-correction term from the regression,
leaving it misspecified.  In the case at hand, the null hypothesis
of  no  cointegration  could  be  rejected  only  for  a  minority  of
countries. 1'  While  on the  face of  it this  would  suggest  that
proceeding  with the  first difference regressions  is acceptable,
this conclusion  may be unwarranted for two  reasons: First,  the
cointegration tests have very low power, particularly in samples
this small (21 observations) and against alternatives involving a
high degree of serial correlation.1 Second and more importantly,
theoretical  considerations  suggest  that  saving  and  investment
should be cointegrated, even under perfect capital mobility.  The
reason  is that  the current account provides  the resources  with
which  a  country repays  its external creditors.  Solvency  thus
imposes a  constraint which prevents deviations  between national
saving and investment from becoming  permanent.  Since gaps between
saving and investment must eventually be reversed for the country
to remain solvent, we should expect that sufficient observations
would show these two series to be cointegrated.'s
Thus, I interpret the failure to reject cointegration in the
majority of cases as a small sample problem and adopt  an error-
correction  (EC) specification of the FH regression.  To conserve
degrees of freedom  given the small  number of observations, I  choose
the simplest such specification, consisting of a regression of the
15  This  is  based on augmented  Dickey-Fuller  tests.  The results
are available upon request.
16 Again, the results are available upon request.
"  When  testing  for  cointegration  between  saving  and
investment,  one  is  effectively  looking  at  the  time  series
properties  of  the current  account.  For  a  number  of  reasons,
ranging from the balance of payments stages hypothesis to serial
correlation  in  foreign  economic  activity  and  world  commodity
prices, one would expect  developing-country current account ratios
to exhibit a substantial degree of serial correlation.
'I  A country's intertemporal  budget  constraint implies  that the
present value  of the cumulative trade balance  should  equal  its
current net international indebtedness.  This in turn implies that
the present value of the cumulative current account should  be zero.
For this to be so, the current account must be stationary.
32change in the investment ratio on a constant, the lagged residual
from the cointegrating regression, and the change  in the saving
ratio.  the coefficient of the latter is the estimate of b.  It is
reported in column (3)  of Table 3 for the OLS version and in column
(6)  for  the  IV  version.  Focusing  on  the  latter,  the
respecification  makes  a  substantial  difference  to  both  the
qualitative  and quantitative nature  of the results.  Of the  56
countries  in the sample, only  four  (Chile, Niger,  Nigeria,  and
Venezuela) produced estimates of b insignificantly different from
the  closed-economy value of  unity, while only one (the  Philippines)
yielded an estimate that was both precisely estimated and greater
than the benchmark value of 0.6.  Of the remaining countries, 25
had estimates of b that were either indistinguishable from zero (22
cases) or below the benchmark.* 9
Taken  at face value, these results would  appear to suggest
that  the  developing  countries  in this  sample  have  exhibited  a
substantial amount of capital mobility --  more so, in fact, than
this methodology is able to detect for industrial countries with
more highly developed capital markets and fewer explicit barriers
to capital movements.  However, alternative interpretations can be
provided for this finding.  Notice that, unlike the situation for
industrial countries, the problem here  is to explain why saving-
investment correlations are so low, not so high.  An  easy, but
rather  destructive  explanation,  is  that  the  data  for  these
countries is simply very poor.  Developing-country macro data are
commonly  held  to  be  much  worse  than  their  industrial-country
counterparts, and since saving estimates tend to be calculated as
residuals, saving  ratios  may be particularly poor approximations to
their  true  values2°.  Errors-in-variables  problems  here  would
indeed tend to bias estimates of b in a downward direction.  What
little can be done about this --i.e., using instrumental variables
to minimize  the  negative  correlation  between  the  contaminated
variable and the error term -- has already been done in column (6).
A  different  (but complementary) interpretation  relies on a
rethinking of the FH test in the developing-country context.  The
rationale for the FH test is that, with  zero capital mobility,
domestic investment must be financed with national saving, whereas
when  capital  mobility  is  high,  domestic  investment  can  be
independent  of national  saving because  external  creditors  will
supply the requisite financing  on market terms.  In  many developing
countries, however, domestic investment can differ  from national
saving even if capital is perfectly immobile in the sense defined
19  Nonsense results (i.e.,  b estimated precisely, but outside
the unit interval) were produced by two countries in this case.
1°  For a  more extensive discussion  of measurement  problems
associated with developing-country  saving data, see  Aghevli et. al.
(1989).
33here  --  i.e., even  if markets  do not  arbitrage  at  all between
domestic and foreign financial instruments.  The reason is that
such countries have access to a nonnegligible quantity of external
financing on nonmarket terms.  Bilateral and multilateral external
assistance  is  indeed  often  intended  precisely  to  supplement
national saving  as a source of financing for investment.  Yet, such
nonmarket aid flows do not represent financial integration in the
sense  described  previously,  because  they  do  not  represent  an
endogenous response of the market to arbitrage opportunities among
financial assets.  Most importantly, such nonmarket flows do not
have the policy implications associated above with the presence of
a high degree of  capital mobility.
What would happen to measured saving-investment correlations
in the presence of nonmarket flows?  Intuitively, since such flows
break the link between national saving and domestic investment,  the
measured correlation between them will be  weakened.  More formally,
consider a country which is financially closed, but which receives
foreign nonmarket assistance.  To the extent that such flows are
devoted to  investment, they belong  in the FH regression,  since
domestic investment now depends not just on national saving, but
also on the magnitude of aid inflows.  Omitting the latter would
leave the FH regression  misspecified.  Standard specification error
analysis suggests that the coefficient  of the saving rate would
still correctly capture the independent effect of national saving
on domestic investment --  and thus serve its intended role as an
indicator of the degree of capital mobiltiy --  as long as all of
the aid inflow was absorbed by investment, because in this case
national saving and aid would be independent variables, and their
effects on investment  could be independently measured.  However, if
the receipt of aid affects the saving rate, then the omission of
the aid variable from the regression would bias the coefficient of
the saving rate, since the latter  would pick up some of the efeects
of  the former on  domestic investment.  Suppose, in particular, that
aid receipts are only partially invested, the rest being consumed.
Then the receipt of aid would lower the measured saving rate.  If
aid flows  are omitted from the FH regression  in this case, the
coefficient  of the  saving  ratio  would  be  biased  downward  as a
measure of the independent effect of national saving on domestic
investment,  because the omitted variable,  which  has  a  positive
coefficient  in  the  "true"  regression,  would  be  negatively
correlated with the included variable  (i.e., an increase in the
saving rate would often reflect a reduction in aid receipts, and
the latter would lower investment).
To correct for this problem, the regressions underlying the
results reported in Table 3 were reestimated taking aid flows into
account.  This was done by measuring such flows as net financing
(disbursements minus  repayments)  received  from multilateral  and
bilateral creditors, and expressing these  as a share of GNP.  In
addition, the change in net foreign assets of the central bank in
each  of  these countries  was treated  in the  same  manner  as the
34receipt of  nonmarket financing, essentially  because this  represents
an additional source for financing saving-investment imbalances in
developing countries without relying on private capital markets.
Since  most  of  the  countries  in  the  sample  maintained  a  fixed
exchange rate during the sample period, the contribution of reserve
flows  is  potentially  large,  and  indeed  accounted  for  several
percentage points of GNP in a number cf instances in this sample.
To conserve  degrees  of freedom,  the reestimation was performed
under the restriction that each of the financing sources had the
same effect on domestic investment.  In other words, the saving
ratio was replaced by the,  ratio of the sum of national saving, net
nonmarket inflows, and reserve depletion to GNP.
The results of the reestimation are reported in Table 4.  The
error-correction  instrumental  variables  estimates  contained  in
column  6  are  the  preferred  results,  since  they  simultaneously
address  all  of the  econometric  issues  raised  in this  section.
Using these estimates, for 9 of the 56 countries in the sample  the
null hypothesis of b-1 could not be rejected at the 95 percent
level  of  confidence.  This  group  includes  India, Nigeria,  the
Philippines, and Venezuela, as well as smaller countries such as
Ghana, Honduras, Kenya, and Niger.  Malawi is also in this group,
although the point estimate of 0.53 is  below the industrial-country
benchmark value of 0.6.  With the exception of Honduras, all of
these countries were found'  in the modal or below-modal group for
the gross-flow index calculated in the previous subsection 2 ".  At
the other extreme are 23 countries with b indistinguishable from
zero  statistically,  as  well  as  9  countries  in which  b  can be
distinguished from both zero and unity, but with point estimates of
b below  0.6.  Among countries discussed in the previous section,
Brazil, Mexico, and Morocco, all of which were taken as exhibiting
financial  openness,  but  not  necessarily  strong  financial
integration, are in this group.  Not surprisingly, so is Malaysia.
In this case, 13  countries produced estimates of b too imprecise to
be useful.
Overall, taken at face value,  the FH methodology indicates
that  developing  countries  tend  to  differ  substantially  among
themselves with respect to their degree of financial integration
with world capital markets, but that for a substantial majority of
such countries (32  out of the 43 relevant cases here) the data are
consistent with a substantial degree of financial openness.  Only
about a fifth of the countries in the sample produced estimates of
b consistent with financial autarky.  What cannot be  determined, of
course, is the extent to which these results truly reflect a high
degree of financial integration, rather than just poor data.  The
broad consistency of the results with previous estimates as well as
with  the  gross-flow  index  suggests  that  they  may  have  some
21  Honduras, with a gross-flow ratio of 10.06 percent, barely
escaped the modal group (see Table 2).
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3.  Arbitrage  conditions
Direct tests  of arbitrage  conditions  have the advantage  of
avoiding  the use of suspect  macro  data, in addition  to not being
subject to  some of the  methodological  problems with  saving-
investment  correlations  discussed  in  Section  III. Accordingly,  in
this  section  I construct  tests  of uncovered  interest  parity  for a
large group of crveloping  countries.  Uncovered, rather than
covered,  parity  is tested  because  very few forward  markets exist
for  the  currencies  of  developing  countries. Even  uncovered  parity
tests are difficult  to conduct for very many such countries,
because time series  observations  on interest rates of adequate
length  are  often  not  available. The  country  sample  was  determined
by the availability  of monthly  data  on interest  rates  payable  to
private  savers  during  the period  January 1985  to December  1990.22
These  tended  to  be either  short-term  (  0  to 6-month)  deposit  rates
or 6-month  Treasury  bill  rates. The countries  in the sample,  and
the interest  rate  chosen  for each,  are listed  in Table  5.
The tests  were  based  on the  behavior  of the "risk  premium"  --
i.e., the difference between the domestic  interest rate and the
relevant  exchange  rate-corrected  ex  post foreign  interest  rate. 23
The use of ex post  exchange  rates  is required,  as usual,  because
the appropriate  ex ante  expectations  of future  exchange  rates  are
unobservable.  As  indicated  in  Section  III,  however,  if
expectations  are  formed rationally,  uncovered interest parity
nevertheless  imposes  some restrictions  on the data that can be
tested.  Among these are that the mean value of the "country
premium"  should  be zero,  and that  deviations  from  the  mean should
be  serially  uncorrelated.  These  propositions  are  tested  in  columns
3  and 5 of Table  5.  Column  3 lists  the  mean value  of the country
premium (deviation  from  UIP) for each country,  with an asterisk
indicating  cases  in  which  the  mean  is  statistically  different  from
zero  at the 95 percent  confidence  level.  Of the 48 countries  in
the sample,  32 exhibited  mean  deviations  that  were  different  from
22  The data are taken  from  the IMF's  International  Financial
Statistics. The restriction  that  interest  rates apply  to assets
available  to private  savers  ruled out the inclusion  of several
countries  for  which  only  discount  rate  data  were  available.
23  The "foreign"  interest  rate  was  taken  to be the  relevant  US
interest rate  in  each  case.  The  rate  on  US  three-month
certificates  of deposit  was used when the domestic rate was a
short-term  deposit  rate,  and the US six-month  Treasury  bill rate
was used  when  the  domestic  rate  was a Treasury  bill  rate.  In all
cases, the  exchange rate was  the period-average  market-based
exchange  rate  against  the  US dollar.
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Cyprus  Oeposit  rate  42sa  Z04  3,44  6.49  6.93  6.06
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El  Salvador  Deposit  rate  -7282a  364  27.86  0.97  1.42  5262
Eq.  Gutnea  Depositrate  asia  z7  46.1  -11.67  -1z67  -11.07
Etimpia  Oeposit  rate  -468a  0.14  86225  0.o  as01  070
Gabon  Deposetrate  s968a  as  44.4  -10.64  -11.49  -10.31
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Malawl  Treasury  bilrate  s866  1.83  13239  -1a26  -2432  -16a218
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M  Oepotrate  7.268  2la  46,44  -11.27  -1242  -1012
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PhIlippines  Treasurybl ate  32.6  1.37  27.31  ass6  0.71  0.48
Rwanda  Deposirate  441a  1.06  41.45  1.06  223  1.078
Senega  Depositrate  7.798  27  47.14  -11.67  -11.080  -11.34
Seyonelles  Treasurybullrate  1229a  1.24  91.69  11.84  15.24  7.64
SierraLeone  Treasurybiflrate  -3ra25a  12a.12  8687  1  1.72  0.31a
Singpore  Depoitrate  a-20  1.05  s94  1.93  1.G6  1.97
SOLI  AInca  Trasury t  rate  -124  .76  6z49  1.42  1.66  0.97a
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a-  Oifferent  From  zero  at  the s percent  leel.zero during this period.  Moreover, in all but one case (the  rather
extreme one of Argentina), Q tests indicate with a very high degree
of confidence that deviations from UIP are serially correlated.
Thus, leaving Argentina aside, at least one of the predictions of
the joint hypothesis of UIP, rational expectations, and  weak market
efficiency can be rejected in every case.
To facilitate comparisons across countries, I have computed
for each country the ratio of its mean absolute deviation from UIP
(that is, the mean over the sample period of the absolute value of
the  country  premium  observed  each  month)  to  the  mean  of  the
exchange rate-corrected foreign interest rate.  Since the latter
indicates what the domestic interest rate would have been if ex
pota UIP had held exactly during each month of the sample period,
this statistic measures how far  the domestic interest rate deviated
on  average  from  what  would  have  been  observed  under  strong
financial integration.  This ratio is reported in the sixth column
of Table 5.  Evidently the countries in the sample are  divided into
two groups: the CFA Franc countries of West Africa and everyone
else.  The  former  (consisting in this  sample  of Cameroon,  the
Central  African  Republic,  Chad,  the  Congo,  Equatorial  Guinea,
Gabon, Mali, and Senegal) exhibit large and negative values of this
ratio.  The reason is that the appreciation of the French Franc
against the US dollar during this period made the ex Rost external
interest rate take on negative values averaging close to zero for
these countries.  The vast majority of the  remaining countries
exhibit average absolute deviations up to twice the magnitude of
the  UIP interest rate.  By this measure, countries such as Uruguay,
Costa  Rica,  Colombia,  Sri  Lanka,  Chile,  and  Mexico  are
characterized by a high degree of capital mobility, in the sense
that their domestic interest rates show relatively small deviations
from their UIP values, while Cyprus, Mauritius, and Seychelles are
at the opposite extreme of very low capital mobility.
To  assess  whether  comparisons  of  this  type  provide  any
evidence of an increase in the degree of integration with world
financial  markets among these countries in recent years,  the sample
period  was  divided  in  hlf  for each  country  and  mean  absolute
deviations were calculated separately for each half of the period.
The results are reported in the last two columns of Table 5.  In 11
of the 48 countries, there was a statistically significant decline
in the  mean  absolute  deviation  during  the  second  half  of  the
sample.  Among the larger countries in this group were Israel and
Mexico.  On the other hand, there were seven cases in which the
mean absolute deviation increased in  the second half of the sample,
including in  Argentina, Brazil, Egypt,  Korea, and Turkey.  Overall,
then, there is little  evidence  of widespread increases in financial
integration here, though several  countries may indeed  have evolved
in this direction.
There  are at  least two reasons to view  these results with
caution, however.  First, the peso problem may be endemic in this
37data set.  The majority of the countries in the sample maintained
predetermined  exchange  rates  during  the  sample  period,  and  we
cannot rule out the possibility that ex post deviations from UIP
reflected expected devaluations that did not come to pass or, for
that  matter,  surprise  devaluations,  particularly  since  several
countries in the sample did experience large discrete devaluations
during this time.  Second, in many cases the interest rates used
for these calculations do not reflect market-determined rates, but
rather  the  administered  rates  characteristic  of  a  repressed
financial system.  Frankel (1991)  has argued that this problem does
not matter, because the ability to sustain domestic interest rates
at  levels  that differ  from their  international counterparts  is
precisely  what  we  mean  by  imperfect  capital  mobility.  This
argument is not convincing, however, for a number of reasons:
a. Though the interest rates we observe (i.e., those in the formal
financial system) may indeed deviate substantially, as do many of
those  in  the  present  sample,  from  their  foreign counterparts,
unobserved market-determined  domestic interest  rates,  such as those
in informal financial markets, may be tied much more closely to
external  rates.  To  the  extent  that  the  latter  represent  the
marginal  cost  of  funds  in  the  domestic  economy,  the  policy
environment  may be more  closely characterized  as one with  high
capital mobility in this case than one with capital immobility.
b.  In  the  case  of  deposit  interest  rates,  the  prevalence  of
domestic interest rates substantially different from foreign ones
may not  reflect the absence of arbitrage,  but rather  imperfect
substitutability arising from the liquidity services rendered by
claims on domestic banks.
c. For Treasury bill rates, reported interest rates may not in fact
reflect  rates of return on assets that  are willingly held,  but
rather  the administered interest rates paid on instruments that
financial  institutions are required to hold in order to satisfy
legal "liquidity" requirements.
The upshot  is that the use of interest rates that are not market
determined  raises  an  important caveat  in the  interpretation of
these results.  While  a finding that reported domestic interest
rates move  closely with  foreign rates may indeed suggest a high
degree  of  capital  mobility,  the  opposite  finding  may  simply
indicate  that  financial  repression  is high,  and that  a  closer
examination of the behavior of domestic market-determined interest
rates is required.
4. Euler equation tests
As indicated in Section III, Euler equation tests may provide
the most direct tests of financial integration, and they avoid some
of  the  conceptual  difficulties  associated  with  both  tests  of
38arbitrage conditions and saving-investment correlations.  In this
section, I therefore implement a set of Euler equation tests, once
again for the largest  group of developing countries for which I  was
able to obtain data.  In this case, the data required are time
series  on  real  per  capita  private consumption,  national  price
levels, and exchange rates.  Although the first of these is often
a binding constraint in developing countries, the Summers-Heston
(1988) data set provides the relevant series  (in  annual form) for
many such countries over the period 1960-85.  Thus the variable n,
used by Obstfeld (1986),  as defined in Section III,  was constructed
for the 60 developing countries for which at least 15  years of data
were  available,  using  Summers-Heston data  for real  per  capita
private  consumption  as well  as  for the  nominal  exchange  rate
against the US dollar, and IFS data for the consumer price index in
each  of  the  developing  countries.  n, was  constructed  with  the
United States as the domestic country and each of the developing
countries  in  the  sample  in turn  as  the  foreign country.  Two
alternatives were chosen for the parameter a  (the inverse of the
intertemporal  elasticity  of  substitution):  2  and  1.  These
correspond  to the  values estimated  by Obstfeld  for the  US  and
Japan, respectively.  As explained in Section III, the procedure
involves determining  whether  variables contained in  the information
set available prior to time t can help to predict n,.
The results are presented in Table 6.  Columns 4 and 5 of this
table report the probability values for the likelihood-ratio test
of  exclusion restrictions  on the constant and a single lagged value
of  nt (column 4), as well as the constant and two lagged  values of
nt (column 5), for the case a=2.  The corresponding tests for a=l
are  reported  in  columns 7  and  8.  Failure  to reject  the  null
hypothesis embodying the exclusion restrictions is consistent with
perfect capital mobility --  i.e., complete financial integration.
Columns 6 and 9 indicate  rejection if it occurs with either one or
two lags.  No additional lags were tried because of the scarcity of
degrees of freedom.
The outcomes of these tests are quite similar to those of the
saving-investment correlations reported in Tables 3 and 4, in the
sense that for the large majority of countries results would seem
to  be  consistent  with  a  high  degree  of  capital  mobility.
Specifically, the null is rejected in only 25 of the 60 countries
tested with  a=2, and in only  17 countries with  a=l.  With  the
single exception of Singapore,  every case of rejection  with a=l was
also a rejection with a=2.  As in the case of saving-investment
correlations,  however, the  interpretation of these results  is
complicated by poor data and few degrees of freedom.  Because the
null is consistent with a high degree of capital mobility, it is
unclear  whether  a  failure  to  reject  reflects  poor  data  or
substantial financial  integration. Moreover, in this  case, as well
as  in  the  Feldstein-Horioka  case,  the  data  in  question  are
developing-country macro data.
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angiadeen  1961484  C  Q37  ao3  Yes  0.38  aa2  Yes
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Euler-equation tests, however, because Summers and Heston provide
an  indicator  of  the  relative  quality  of  their  data  across
countries.  This data "grade" is reported in column 3 of Table 6,
with quality deteriorating from A to D.  The incidence of rejection
for grades A-C was 20 out of 44 countries, whereas for countries
graded D it was only  5 of 16 with  a=2.  For a=l, only  2 of 16
countries with grade D rejected the null, while for those graded C
and higher  about a  third  (15 of 44) involved  rejections.  This
suggests a clear association between poor data quality and failure
to reject, and it implies that Euler equation tests using annual
data for large groups of developing countries  can in many  cases
provide only weak evidence on the issue of financial integration.
VI. Summary and Conclusions
As pointed out at the outset, an economy's degree of financial
integration with the rest of the world is a key determinant of many
of  its most  important macroeconomic  properties.  For  the  vast
majority  of developing countries, however, little is known about
the nature  of the links between domestic and external financial
markets. As a  result,  conflicting  assumptions  are  often  made  about
this  important  feature  of developing  economies  in  both analytical
and policy  work.  The  question  that  has  been  posed  here  is whether
the data impose  any  restrictions  on such  assumptions. This issue
has  been  approached both by  examining previous work  and  by
undertaking, for the  first time, a  systematic application  of
existing  approaches  to  the  measurement  of  capital  mobility  to  large
groups  of developing  countries.
Unfortunately,  a  number  of  complicating  factors  are
encountered  in attempting  to answer  this question,  which  are both
conceptual  and empirical.  Conceptually,  there are two types of
complicating  factors:  First,  there is no single widely-accepted
empirical measure of  the  degree  of  an  economy's financial
integration  with the rest of the world.  This problem arises
precisely  because  of the large  number  of implications  that follow
from financial  integration  in the strong sense.  Since  tests of
financial  integration  essentially  examine whether the data are
consistent  with  these  implications,  each  such  implication  provides
a separate  test.  Second, each of the existing empirical  tests
presents  problems  of interpretation.  Such tests  are based  on the
magnitude  of gross  capital  flows,  the applicability  of arbitrage
conditions,  the scope  for sterilization,  the strength  of saving-
investment  correlations,  and  the  cross-country  uniformity  of Euler
equation  relationships.  Perhaps  the  most  widely  used  of these  have
been  tests  of  arbitrage  conditions  and  saving-investment
correlations.  Yet the former  suffer from the need to identify
comparable  assets  across  countries,  to make ancillary  assumptions
about unobservable expectations and  agents'  information sets
40(resulting  in  tests  .f  joint  hypotheses),  and  from  the  l'peso
problem".  Moreover,  'he  policy  implications  of  rejections  of
arbitrage conditions depend on the reasons for rejection, and this
has proven to be a difficult question to resolve in the industrial-
country context.  The latter, on the other hand, are contaminated
by a  host of factors  that could cause saving and investment to  move
together  even  under  perfect  capital  mobility.  Tests  of
restrictions implied by Euler equations, a more promising recent
approach that avoids both of these types of problems, require very
strong  restrictions on  consumer behavior across countries for their
implementation.
Empirically,  developing-country  data  provide  a  serious
challenge  which compounds  these conceptual  problems.  The  main
difficulties  are  that  the national  income  accounting  data  that
underlie  both saving-investment correlations  and tests  based on
Euler equations tend to be of poor quality.  The resulting errors-
in-variables problem makes it difficult to reject null hypotheses
consistent with high capital mobility.  On the other hand, reported
interest-rate data often do not refer to market-determined rates.
Arbitrage conditions may therefore not tend to hold for observed
interest  rates,  but  may  well  hold  for  "informal"  rates  that
represent the true cost of funds in the economy.  This could lead
to a rejection of high capital mobility when it indeed holds.  The
central difficulty is that these data problems operate in opposite
directions.  Poor macro data will yield results consistent with a
high  degree  of  financial  integration  when  saving-investment
correlations  and  Euler  equation  tests  are  applied,  while  poor
interest-rate data  will  cause  tests of  arbitrage  conditions  to
support a finding of low financial integration.
In view of the direction of the biases  just mentioned, the
juxtaposition of several tests may be the most judicious manner to
formulate at least a first-pass impression of the extent to which
large  groups  of  individual  developing  countries  have  been
integrated with world financial markets in recent times.  This was
attempted  in Section V.  The results of  this  section are best
presented  by  summarizing  what  this  evidence  has  to  say  on  a
country-by-country basis.  For the 99 countries contained in the
various samples examined in Section V, the weight of the evidence
in each  case  is summarized  in an  appendix.  Of  this  group,  a
majority provided enough evidence as to permit at least a crude
subjective characterization  of their degree  of integration with
world financial market during the period considered here.  In some
cases,  however, the tests indeed  proved  contradictory, as suggested
above, and such cases will require further study.  On the other
hand, alternative tests were in broad agreement for a larger group
of countries.
For such countries, this characterization is  provided in  Table
7, where the degree of financial integration with the rest of the
world of 57 individual developing countries  is characterized as
41"High", "Intermediate", or "Low".  An important  finding of this
paper, consistent with a growing body of empirical work, is that
a  large  number  of  developing  countries  can  be  described  as
financially  open.  This  characterization  would  apply  to  the
countries exhibiting a high or intermediate degree of financial
integration in Table 7.  Of the 57 countries classified in Table 7,
in only 18 cases did the data fail to generate convincing evidence
of financial openness, and for some of these countries other forms
of evidence  (e.g., capital flight from Venezuela)  indicate that
financial autarky is not an apt description of the nature of their
relationship  with  world  financial  markets.  Specific  policy
implications  for  individual countries  will  have  to  await  more
careful country-specific  work to yield more refined measures of the
degree of financial integration in specific cases.  Nonetheless,
both the evidence in the existing literature and that presented
here imply that, while cases of strong financial integration  may be
rare in the developing world, the majority of developing countries
must be regarded, for both policy and analytical work, as de facto
financially open.
42Table 7 Classification  of Countries  By Degree  of Financial  Integration
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Bolivia  Botswana  Bangladesh
Chile  Burundi  El Salvador
Congo  Cameroon  Ethiopia
Cote d' Ivoire  Colombia  Ghana
Dominican  Rep.  Costa Rica  Honduras
Gabon  Cyprus  India
Gambia  Ecuador  Kenya
Israel  Egypt  Mauritius
Jamaica  Guatemala  Morocco
Panama  Haiti  Nepal
Senegal  Korea  Niger
Singapore  Lesotho  Paraguay
Togo  Madagascar  Philippines
Uruguay  Malawi  Rwanda
Malaysia  South  Africa
Mauritania  Sri Lanka
Mexico  Tunisia
Pakistan  Venezuela




Trinidad  & Tobago
Turkey
Uganda
Source:  See  AppendixAPPENDIX
The following is a country-by country summary of the tests
performed in the text, for all countries contained in any of the
samples.  In  addition,  each  country  has  been  classified-
subjectively into one of three categories of financial integration
(High,  Intermediate,  or  Low) during  the eighties according to these
measures.  Countries for which information was available for only
one measure of integration (typically  the  gross-flow ratio measure,
or GFR) were left unclassified,  as were those for which the various
measures  were  judged too  pontradictory to  permit  even  a  rough
classification.  The group classifications reported below for the
GFR measure refer to the ranges reported in the text --  i.e., Group
1 exhibited a GFR greater than 20 percent, that for Group  2 was
-less  than 20 percent but greater  than 15 percent, Group 3  was below
15 but above 10 percent, the modal Group 4 represented the range
below  10 but above 5 percent, and finally Group  5 included all
countries with GFR ratios below 5 percent.  No systematic  rules
were  imposed  on  the  classification  procedure,  except  that  the
presumption was against classification in the High range  if the
preferred Euler equation test rejected integration.  On the other
hand, little  weight was given to this test when it failed to reject
integration with poor data (rated  D by Summers and Heston).
AFRICA
1. Algeria - Unclassified
GFR is in Group 4; PH test yields b not different from zero or
one.
2. Benin - Unclassified
The coefficient  b in  the FH test is  statistically different from
both 0 and 1; no other information.
3. Botswana - Intermediate
GFR is in Group 3, and the mean deviation from UIP is not
different from zero, though its mean absolute deviation is
fairly high.
4. Burkina Faso - Unclassified
The only information is from GFR, which is fairly low (Group
5).
5.  Burundi - Intermediate
The FH coefficient b is different from 0 and 1; the Euler
equation test fails to reject financial integration, but the
data is poor (D).
6. Cameroon - Int3rmediate
The FH coefficient b is different from 0 and 1 and the Euler
test fails to reject integration  with data quality C.
447. Cape  Verde  - Unclassified
The only information is from GFR (Group 4).
8. Central African Republic - Unclassified
GFR is in Group 4; the FH coefficient b is not different from 0
or 1.
9. Chad - Unclassified
The only information is from GFR (Group 4).
10. Congo  - High
GFR is in Group 1; the FH test puts b in the intermediate
range; the Euler test fails to reject integration (though  with
D-quality data).
11. Cote  d'Ivoire  - High
Group 2 in the GFR test; the FH coefficient b in the
intermediate range; the Euler test fails to reject integration
with C-qu%,lity  data.
12. Ethiopia  - Low
Lowest group in  GFR test; the UIP differential is statistically
different from zero, though not large; Euler test rejects
integration.
13. Gabon  - High
Group 2 in the GFR test; the PH coefficient b is in the
intermediate range; the Euler test fails to reject integration
with C-quality data.
14. Gambia  - High
Group 2 in GFR test; the FH test rejects b-i, but not b=0; the
UIP differential is not different from 0, and the Euler test
fails to reject integration (data quality is D).
15. Ghana  - Low
Group 4 in GFR test; FH test rejects b-O and fails to reject
b-i; UIP differential is different from zero; the Euler test
rejects integration.
16. Guinea-Bisseau  - Unclassified
The only information is from the GFR test  (Group 2).
17. Kenya  - Low
Group 4 in the GFR test; the FH coefficient b is  different from
0 but not different from 1; the UIP differential is different
from 0; the Euler test rejects integration.
18. Liberia  - Unclassified
Only the Euler test is available (fails to reject with poor
data).
4519.  Lesotho  - Intermediate
Group 2 in GFR test, and the FH test rejects b=l, but fails to
reject b=0; however, the UIP differential is different from
zero and high.
20. Madagascar  - Intermediate
Group 3 in GFR test;  the FH test fails to reject b=O, but
rejects b=l; however, the Euler test rejects integration.
21. Malawi  - Intermediate
The FH test rejects b=0, but the estimate of b is relatively
low (0.53); the UIP differential is different from 0.
22. Mali - Unclassified
Group 4 in GFR test, but the FH test rejects b=l while failing
to reject b=0.
23. Mauritania  - Intermediate
Group 2 in GFR test and the FH coefficient b is in the
intermediate range.
24. Mauritius  - Low
Though the FH coefficient b is in the intermediate range, the
GFR measure puts this country in Group 4; though the UIP
differential is not different from zero, it is very high on
average; the Euler test rejects integration.
25. Morocco - Low
Group 4 in GFR test; though the FH test rejects b=l and fails
to reject b=0, the Euler test rejects integration.
26. Niger  - Low
Group 4 in GFR test; the FH test rejects b=0 but fails to
reject b=l; the Euler test rejects integration.
27. Rwanda  - Low
Group 5 in GFR test; the FH coefficient estimate is imprecise;
the UIP differential is different from 0 and high; the Euler
test fails to reject integration, but the data is poor.
28. Senegal  - High
GFR is in Group 3; the FH rejects b=l, but not b=0; the Euler
test fails to reject integration with C-quality data.
29. Seychelles  - Intermediate
GFR is in Group 3, but the UIP differential is different from
0 and very high.
30. Sierra  Leone  - Intermediate
GFR is in Group 3 and the FH test rejects b=l while failing to
reject b=1, but the UIP differential is different from 0 and
the Euler test rejects integration.
4631. Somalia  - Unclassified
GFR is in Group 3; the Euler test fails to reject integration,
but with D-quality data.
32. South  Africa  - Low
GFR is in Group 5; though the UIP differential not different
from 0, it is high on average; the Euler test fails to reject
integration, but the data is poor.
33. Sudan  - Unclassified
GFR is in Group 5; the Euler test fails to reject integration,
but with D-quality data.
34. Swaziland  - Unclassified
GFR is in Group 3: the Euler test fails to reject integration,
but with D-quality data.
35. Tanzania  - Unclassified
GFR is in Group 4; the Euler test fails to reject integration
with D-quality data.
36. Togo  - High
GFR is in Group 2, the FH test rejects b=l while failing to
reject b=O, and the Euler test also fails to.  reject
integration, though the data is poor.
37. Tunisia  - Low
GFR is in Group 4; the FH coefficient b is in the intermediate
range, but the Euler test rejects integration.
38. Uganda  - Intermediate
GFR is in Group 3; the FH coefficent test rejects b=O, but not
b-1.
39.  Zaire  - Unclassified
GFR is in Group 4, but the Euler test fails to reject
integration, though with D-quality data.
40.  Zambia  - Unclassified
GFR is in Group 2, but the Euler test rejects integration.
41. Zimbabwe  - Unclassified
The Euler test fails to reject integration, but with poor data.
ASIA
42. Bangladesh  - Low
GFR is in Group 5 and the Euler test rejects integration.
43.  Bhutan  - Unclassified
The UIP differential is different from zero, but not large.
4744. Fiji - Unclassified
GFR is in Group 4, but the FH test rejects b=1 while failing to
reject b=0.
45. India - Low
GFR is in Group 5; the FH test rejects b=0 and the coefficient
b is high; the Euler test rejects integration.
46. Indonesia - Unclassified
GFR is in Group 5, but the UIP differential is not
significantly different from zero.
47. Korea - Intermediate
GFR is in Group 4, but the UIP differential is not
significantly different from zero, and the Euler test cannot
reject integration even with B-quality data.
48. Malaysia - Intermediate
The FH test rejects b-l and b is very low (0.25),  but GFR is in
Group 4, the UIP differential differs from zero, and the Euler
test rejects integration.
49.  Myanmar - Unclassified
The Euler test cannot reject integration with C-quality data.
50. Nepal - Low
The FH test put b in the intermediate range; the UIP
differential is different from zero; the Euler test rejects
integration.
51. Pakistan - Intermediate
GFR is in Group 5, but the FH test rejects b=1 while not
rejecting b-0, and Euler test cannot reject integration even
with B-quality data.
52. Papua New Guinea - Intermediate
GFR is in Group 3 and FH test rejects b=l, but not b=0.
53. Philippines - Low
GFR is in Group 4, the FH test rejects b=0, but not b=1, and
the Euler test rejects integration.
54. Singapore - High
GFR is in Group 1 and the UIP differential is not
significantly different from zero, but the Euler test rejects
integration.
55. Sri Lanka - Low
GFR is in Group 4; the UIP differential isdifferent from zero,
though not high; the Euler test rejects integration.
56. Thailand - Intermediate
48GFR is in Group 4;  the UIP  differential is  different from zero;
the Euler test fails to reject integration with C- quality
data.
57..Tonga - Unclassified
GFR is in Group 5; no other information.
58. Western Samoa - Unclassified
GFR is in Group 4; no other information.
EUROPE
59. Cyprus - Intermediate
GFR is in Group 4, the UIP differential is significant and
large, but the Euler test fails to reject even with B-quality
data.
60. Turkey - Intermediate
GFR is in Group 4, but the UIP differential is not different
from 0 and Euler test fails to reject integration with C-
quality data.
MIDDLE EAST
61.  Bahrain - Unclassified
GFR is in Group 3; no other information.
62. Egypt - Intermediate
GFR is in  Group 4; the FH  coefficcient b is in the intermediate
range; the UIP differential is different from zero; the Euler
test fails to reject with poor data.
63. Israel - High
GFR  is  in Group 3; the UIP differential is not different from
zero; the Euler test fails to reject with A data.
64. Kuwait - Unclassified
GFR is in Group 2; no other information.
65. Lybia - Unclassifed
GFR is in Group 4; no other information.
66. Saudi Arabia - Unclassified
GFR is in Group 3, but the Euler test rejects integration.
67. Syria - Unclassified
GFR is in Group 4; no other information.
WESTERN HEMISPHERE
68.  Antigua  - Unclassified
GFR  is  in  Group  1;  no  other  information.
4969. Argentina  - Unclassified
The UIP differential is not different from zero; no other
information.
70. Bahamas  - Unclassified
GFR is in Group 5; no other information.
71. Barbados  - Unclassified
GFR is in Group 4; no other information.
72. Bolivia  - High
GFR is in Group 2; the Euler test fails to reject integration
with B data.
73. Brazil  - Unclassified
GFR is in Group 4, but the FH test rejects b=l while not
rejecting b=O.
74. Chile  - High
GFR is in Group 2; the FH test rejects b=l; the UIP
differential is not different from 0; the Euler test fails to
reject integration  with C data.
75. Colombia  - Intermediate
GFR is in Group 4; the FH estimate of b is in the intermediate
range; the UIP differential is different from zero, but low;
the Euler test fails to reject integration with B data.
76. Costa  Rica  - Intermediate
GFR is in Group 1; the FH estimate of b is in the intermediate
range; the UIP differential is different from zero but low;
the Euler test rejects integration.
77. Dominica  - Unclassified
GFR is in Group 4; no other information.
78. Dominican  Republic  - High
GFR is in Group 4, but the FH estimate of b is low and the
Euler test fails to reject integration with C-quality data.
79. Ecuador  - Intermediate
GFR is in Group 2; the FH test rejects b=l, but not b=0; the
UIP differential is not different from 0.
80.  El Salvador  - Low
The FH test rejects b=l with low b, but the GFR is in Group 4,
UIP is different from 0, and the Euler test rejects
integration.
81. Grenada  - Ur,classified
GFR is in Group 3; no other information.
5082. Guatemala  - Intermediate
The FH test rejects b=1 while failing to reject b=O, and the
UIP differential is not different from 0, but GFR is in Group
4 and the Euler test rejects integration.
83. Guyana  - Unclassified
The Euler test fails  to reject  integration with C-quality data.
84. Haiti  - Intermediate
GFR is in Group 5, but the Euler test fails to reject with C-
quality data.
85. Honduras -Low
GRF is in Group 3 and UIP is not different from 0, but the
latter would be rejected at a slightly higher sugnificance
level, the FH test rejects b=O, and the Euler test rejects
integration.
86. Jamaica - High
The UIP differential differs from 0 and is relativelly high on
average, but GFR is in Group 1 and the Euler test fails to
reject integration with C-quality data.
87. Mexico  - Intermediate
GFR is in Group 4 and the Euler test rejects integration, but
the FH test rejects b=l with very low b and, though the UIP
differential differs from 0, it is low on average.
88.  Nicaragua  - Unclassified
GRF is in Group 1; no other information.
89. Panama  - High
GRF is in Group 1; the Euler test fails to reject with B-
quality data.
90. Paraguay  - Low
Though the FH test rejects b=l, GFR is in Group 4 and the Euler
test rejects integration.
91. Peru  - Unclassified
The FH test rejects b=l; no other information.
92. Sao Tome  & Principe  - Unclassifed
GFR is in Group 1; no other information.
93. St.  Kitts  - Unclassified
GFR is in Group 2; no other information.
94. St.  Lucia  - Unclassified
GFR is in Group 3; no other information.
95. St. Vincent  - Unclassified
51GFR is in Group 4; no other information.
96. Suriname - Unclassified
GFR is in Group 5; no other information.
97. Trinidad - Intermediate
GFR is in  Group 4; the UIP differential is  different from zero,
but not large.
98. Uruguay - High
Though GFR is in Group 4, the FH test rejects b-l, the UIP
differential is not different from zero, and its mean absolute
valUe is very small.
99. Venezuela - Low
GFR is in Group 4; the FH test rejects b=O; the UIP
differential is different from zero; the Euler test rejects
integration.
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